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Nonprofit crowdsourcing platforms such as food recovery organizations rely on volunteers to perform time-
sensitive tasks. Thus, their success crucially depends on efficient volunteer utilization and engagement. To
encourage volunteers to complete a task, platforms use nudging mechanisms to notify a subset of volunteers
with the hope that at least one of them responds positively. However, since excessive notifications may
reduce volunteer engagement, the platform faces a trade-off between notifying more volunteers for the current
task and saving them for future ones. Motivated by these applications, we introduce the online volunteer
notification problem, a generalization of online stochastic bipartite matching where tasks arrive following a
known time-varying distribution over task types. Upon arrival of a task, the platform notifies a subset of
volunteers with the objective of minimizing the number of missed tasks. To capture each volunteer’s adverse
reaction to excessive notifications, we assume that a notification triggers a random period of inactivity, during
which she will ignore all notifications. However, if a volunteer is active and notified, she will perform the
task with a given pair-specific match probability that captures her preference for the task. We develop two
online randomized policies that achieve constant-factor guarantees which are close to the upper bound we
establish for the performance of any online policy. Our policies as well as hardness results are parameterized
by the minimum discrete hazard rate of the inter-activity time distribution. The design of our policies relies
on two modifications of an ex-ante feasible solution: (i) properly scaling down the notification probability
prescribed by the ex-ante solution, and (ii) sparsifying that solution. Further, in collaboration with Food
Rescue U.S., a volunteer-based food recovery platform, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our policies by
testing them on the platforms data from various locations across the U.S.
Key words : nonprofit crowdsourcing, volunteer management, notification fatigue, online platforms,
competitive analysis
1. Introduction
Volunteers in the U.S. provide around 8 billion hours of free labor annually. However, roughly 30%
of volunteers become disengaged the following year, representing a loss of approximately $70 billion
in economic value as well as a significant challenge for the sustainability of organizations relying
on volunteerism (National Service 2015, Independent Sector 2018). Lack of retention partially
stems from overutilization as well as the mismatch between a volunteer’s preferences and the
opportunities presented to her (Locke et al. 2003, Brudney and Meijs 2009). The emergence of online
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volunteer crowdsourcing platforms presents a unique opportunity to design data-driven volunteer
management tools that cater to volunteers’ heterogeneous preferences. In the present work, we move
toward this goal by taking an algorithmic approach to designing nudging mechanisms commonly
used to encourage volunteers to perform tasks.
This work is motivated by our collaboration with a nonprofit platform called Food Rescue U.S.
(FRUS) that recovers food from local businesses and donates it to nonprofit agencies by crowd-
sourcing the transportation to volunteers. In the following, we provide background on FRUS and
highlight the challenge it faces when making volunteer nudging decisions. Further, we offer insights
into volunteer behavior by analyzing FRUS data from different locations. Then, we list a summary
of our contributions.
FRUS: A Crowdsourcing Platform for Food Recovery: FRUS is a leading online platform
that simultaneously addresses the societal problems of food waste and hunger. Over 60 million tons
of food go to waste in the U.S. each year, while in 2018, 37 million peopleincluding 11 million chil-
drenlived in food-insecure households (ReFED 2016, Coleman-Jensen et al. 2018). This mismatch
is driven in part by the cost of last-mile transportation required to recover perishable donated food
from local restaurants and grocery stores. FRUS has empowered donors by connecting them to
local agencies and enabling free delivery through its dedicated volunteer base. Currently, it oper-
ates in tens of locations across different states, and so far it has recovered over 50 million pounds
of food. On FRUS, a volunteering task—which is referred to as a rescue—involves transporting
a prearranged, perishable food donation from a donor to a local agency. Scheduled donations are
often recurring and they are posted on the FRUS app in advance. While around 78% of rescues
are claimed organically by volunteers before the day of the rescue, around 22% remain unclaimed
on the last day.1 In that case, to encourage volunteers to claim the rescue, FRUS notifies a subset
of volunteers with the hope that at least one of them responds positively. However, based on our
interviews with the platform’s local managers, FRUS faces a challenge when deciding whom to
notify: on the one hand, it aims to minimize the probability of a missed rescue—which is achievable
by notifying more volunteers.2 On the other hand, it wants to avoid excessive notifications because
that may reduce volunteer engagement.3
Understanding volunteer behavior can help resolve the aforementioned trade-off: if volunteers
have preferences for certain rescues, then FRUS should mainly notify them for those tasks. Our
1 Here, by organic, we mean volunteers sign up for those rescues without the platform’s involvement.
2 According to our analysis of FRUS data, a missed rescue increases the probability of donor dropout by a factor of
more than 2.5.
3 We remark that FRUS’s current practice in many locations is to notify a volunteer at most once a week. Further,
we note that FRUS is hesitant to demand prompt responses from volunteers, which renders the option of sequentially
notifying volunteers impractical.
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Figure 1 Figure 1a shows the first three principal components (PCs) for characteristics of rescues completed by
the five most active volunteers in Location (a). Each color represents a different volunteer and the size of each
circle is proportional to the frequency with which the volunteer completes a rescue with those PCs. Figure 1b
shows the same plot for Location (b).
analysis of two years of data indeed indicates that volunteer preferences are fairly consistent. To
highlight this, in Figure 1 we visualize the first three principal components for characteristics of
rescues completed by the most active volunteers in two FRUS locations. Each color represents
a different volunteer, and the size of each circle is proportional to the frequency with which the
volunteer completes a rescue of that type. For instance, more than 90% of the rescues completed by
the red volunteer in Location (a), as shown in Figure 1a, are clustered within a cube whose volume
is less than one tenth of the PCA component range. As evident from these plots, volunteers tend to
claim rescues that have similar characteristics, reflecting their geographical and time preferences.4
Our interviews and empirical findings raise a key question that motivates our work: facing such
volunteer behavior, how should a volunteer-based online platform, such as FRUS, design an effective
notification system for time-sensitive tasks?
Summary of Contributions: Motivated by our collaboration with FRUS, we (i) introduce the
online volunteer notification problem which captures key features of volunteer labor consistent with
the literature, (ii) develop two online randomized policies that achieve constant-factor guarantees
for the online volunteer notification problem, (iii) establish an upper bound on the performance of
any online policy, and (iv) demonstrate the effectiveness of our policies by testing them on FRUS’s
data from various locations across the U.S.
Modeling the Platform’s Notification Problem: We introduce the online volunteer noti-
fication problem to model a platform’s notification decisions when utilizing volunteers to com-
plete time-sensitive tasks. There are three main considerations that the platform should take into
4 Characteristics or features of a rescue includes its origin-destination location, day, time, etc.
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account: (i) volunteers’ response to a notification is uncertain, (ii) the platform cannot expect vol-
unteers to respond promptly, and (iii) if notified excessively, volunteers may suffer from notification
fatigue. To include all of these considerations in our model, we assume that when each task arrives,
the platform simultaneously notifies a subset of volunteers in the hope that at least one responds
positively. To model a volunteer’s adverse reaction toward excessive notifications, we assume that
a volunteer can be in one of two possible states: active or inactive. In the former state, the vol-
unteer pays attention to the platforms notifications and responds positively with her task-specific
match probability, whereas in the latter state she ignores all notifications. After being notified (and
potentially responding), an active volunteer will transition to the inactive state for a random inter-
activity period. These three modeling considerations are aligned with the literature on volunteer
management (see, e.g., Ata et al. (2019) and McElfresh et al. (2019)), where volunteers—unlike
paid employees—cannot be required to respond and typically go through periods of inactivity (as
a consequence of utilization). Further, as mentioned in Footnote 3, in various locations, FRUS’s
managers follow the strategy of notifying a volunteer at most once per week and do not require
prompt responses from volunteers. This practice fits within our modeling framework by setting the
inter-activity period to be deterministic and equal to 7 days.
Because these platforms usually require the recurring completion of similar tasks, they can
use historical data to predict their future last-minute needs. For instance, FRUS usually receives
donations from the same source on a weekly basis. We model this by assuming that tasks belong
to a given set of types and they arrive according to a (time-varying) distribution. The platform
makes online decisions aiming to maximize the number of completed tasks knowing the arrival
rates, match probabilities, and the inter-activity time distribution, but without observing the state
of each volunteer.
Optimally resolving the trade-off between notifying a volunteer about the current task or saving
her for the future depends jointly on the state of all volunteers. As a consequence, determining the
optimal notification strategy in the online volunteer notification problem is intractable due to the
curse of dimensionality of the underlying dynamic program even when volunteers’ states are known.
Thus, even for the special case of deterministic inter-activity periods, where the platform knows
the state of each volunteer, the problem remains intractable. In light of this challenge, we design
online policies that can be computed in polynomial time, and we prove constant-factor guarantees
on their performance. Next, we give an overview of our policies.
Developing Online Policies: We develop two randomized policies that are based on ex ante
fractional solutions that can be computed in polynomial time. In order to assess the performance
of our policies, we use a linear program benchmark whose optimal value serves as an upper bound
on the value of a clairvoyant solution which knows the sequence of arrivals a priori as well as the
Manshadi and Rodilitz: Efficient Volunteer Crowdsourcing 5
state of volunteers at each time (see Program (LP), Proposition 1 and Definition 3). We remark
that the platform’s objective—maximizing the number of completed tasks—jointly depends on the
response of all volunteers and exhibits diminishing returns. For example, if the platform notifies
two active volunteers v and u about a task of type s, then the probability of completion would
be [1− (1− pv,s)(1− pu,s)] where pv,s and pu,s are the match probabilities of the pairs (v, s) and
(u, s), respectively. This objective function presents two challenges: (i) an ex ante solution based on
upper bounding such an objective function by a piecewise linear one can be ineffective in practice,
and (ii) jointly analyzing volunteers’ contribution for an online policy while keeping track of the
joint distribution of their states (active or inactive) is prohibitively difficult, even in the special
case of deterministic inter-activity times. We address the former challenge by computing ex ante
solutions that “better” approximate the true objective function as opposed to only relying on the
LP solution (see Programs (AA) and (SQ-v) and Proposition 2). We overcome the latter one by
assuming an artificial priority among volunteers which allows us to decouple their contributions
(see Definition 4 and Lemma 1).
Attempting to follow the fractional ex ante solution can result in poor performance since, under
such a policy, volunteers can become inactive at inopportune times (see Section 5.2 and Proposition
3). Therefore, in the design of our policies, we modify the ex ante solution to account for inactivity
while guaranteeing a constant-factor competitive ratio. Our first policy, the scaled-down notification
(SDN) Policy, relies on computing in advance the probability that a volunteer is active when
following this policy. Equipped with these probabilities, the SDN policy notifies each volunteer
such that the joint probability that a volunteer is active and notified is proportional to the ex ante
solution (see Algorithm 1 and the preceding discussion). On the other hand, our second policy,
the sparse notification (SN) Policy, relies on solving a sequence of dynamic programs (DPs)—one
for each volunteer—to resolve the trade-off between notifying a volunteer now and saving her for
future tasks. We solve the DPs in order of volunteers’ artificial priorities, and each subsequent DP
is formulated based on the previous solutions (see Algorithm 2 and the preceding discussion).
Our policies are parameterized by the minimum discrete hazard rate (MDHR) of the inter-
activity time distribution, which serves as a sufficient condition for the level of “activeness” of
volunteers (see Definition 1 and the following discussion). We analyze the competitive ratios of
both policies as functions of the MDHR. Interestingly, both of these non-adaptive policies achieve
the same competitive ratio (see Theorems 1 and 2) and require nearly identical computation time
(see Remark 1 at the end of Section 4.3). However, in certain cases, the SN policy can perform
nearly twice as well (as shown in Section 5.2), and it demonstrates significantly better performance
in practice (as shown in Section 6).
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The analysis of both policies relies on decomposing the problem into individual contributions
based on our (artificial) priority scheme. Further, the analysis of the SDN policy relies on proving
that the probability of being active can be controlled and computed a priori in polynomial time
(see Section 4.2). The analysis of the SN policy crucially uses the dual-fitting framework of Alaei
et al. (2012) and it relies on formulating a linear program along with its dual to place a lower
bound on the optimal value of each volunteer’s DP (see Section 4.3).
Upper Bound on Online Policies: In order to gain insight into the limitation of online policies
when compared to our benchmark, we develop an upper bound on the achievable competitive ratio
of any online policy, even policies which cannot be computed in polynomial time. Like our policies,
the upper bound is parameterized by the MDHR (see Theorem 3). As a consequence, the gap
between the achievable upper bound and our lower bound (attained through our policies) depends
on the MDHR (see Figure 2). When it is small but positive, the gap is fairly small; however, the
gap grows as the MDHR increases. Our upper bound relies on analyzing two instances, one of
which provides a relatively tight upper bound when the MDHR is small.
Testing on FRUS Data: In order to illustrate the effectiveness of our modeling approach and
our policies in practice, we evaluate the performance of our policies by testing them on FRUS’s
data from different locations. In Section 6, we describe how we estimate model primitives and
construct problem instances. Then we numerically show the superior performance of our policies
when compared to different benchmarks, including strategies that resemble the current practice at
different locations. Further, we present numerical results that demonstrate the robustness of our
policies in the presence of small misspecifications of the model primitives, i.e., the arrival rates and
the match probabilities (see Appendix E and Table 2).
While our collaboration with FRUS motivated us to introduce and study the online volunteer
notification problem, our framework can be applied well beyond FRUS to a wide range of settings.
Thousands of other nonprofits make use of platforms like DialMyCalls to send instantaneous noti-
fications to their volunteer base.5 Similar to FRUS, these nonprofits face the challenge of striking
the right balance between notifying enough interested volunteers to fulfill an immediate need while
avoiding excessive notification. Our framework and data-driven approach can be utilized in cus-
tomizing such online notification systems. Moving beyond volunteer crowdsourcing, the negative
impact of excessive notifications and marketing fatigue have been well-documented in marketing
and social network engagement (Sinha and Foscht 2007, Cheng et al. 2010, Byers et al. 2012).
In these applications, similar tensions arise between maximizing an immediate payoff (such as
short-term engagement) and limiting notifications (Borgs et al. 2010, Lin et al. 2017, Cao et al.
5 Social network platforms such as Facebook have also been utilized as exemplified in the context of blood donation
(McElfresh et al. 2019, Brown 2020).
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2019). As such, our general framework can also be applied to managing notification fatigue in the
aforementioned contexts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In
Section 3, we formally introduce the online volunteer notification problem as well as the benchmark
and the measure of competitive ratio. Section 4 is the main algorithmic section of the paper and
is devoted to describing and analyzing our two online policies. In Section 5, we present our upper
bound on the achievable competitive ratio of any online policy as well as an upper bound on the
performance of following the ex ante solution. In Section 6, we revisit the FRUS application and
demonstrate the effectiveness of our policies by testing them on the platforms data from various
locations. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
Our work relates to and contributes to several streams of literature.
Volunteer Operations and Staffing: Due to the differences between volunteer and traditional
labor as highlighted in Sampson (2006), managing a volunteer workforce provides unique challenges
and opportunities that have been studied in the literature using various methodologies (Gordon
and Erkut 2004, Falasca and Zobel 2012, Lacetera et al. 2014, So¨nmez et al. 2016, Ata et al. 2019,
McElfresh et al. 2019, Urrea et al. 2019). One key operational challenge is the uncertainty in both
volunteer labor supply and demand. Using an elegant queuing model, Ata et al. (2019) studies
the problem of volunteer staffing with an application to gleaning organizations. Our approach to
modeling volunteer behavior (specifically, assuming that notifying an active volunteer triggers a
random period of inactivity) bears some resemblance to the modeling approach taken in Ata et al.
(2019).
In a novel recent work, McElfresh et al. (2019) studies the problem of matching blood donors
to donation centers, assuming that donors have preferences (over centers) and constraints on the
frequency of receiving notifications. Using a stochastic matching policy, they demonstrate strong
numerical performance relative to various benchmarks. There are some similarities between our
modeling approach and the approach used in McElfresh et al. (2019), but we highlight three key
differences. (i) While their work focuses on the numerical evaluation of policies, we theoretically
analyze the performance of our policies and provide an upper bound on the performance achievable
by any online policy, as stated in Theorems 1, 2, and 3. (ii) We model volunteers’ adverse reactions
to excessive notifications in a general form by considering an arbitrary inter-activity time distri-
bution. (iii) We parameterize our achievable upper and lower bounds by the minimum discrete
hazard rate of that distribution.
Crowdsourcing Platforms: Reflecting the growth of online technologies, there is a burgeoning
literature on the operations of crowdsourcing platforms. Examples of work from this domain include
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Karger et al. (2014) for task crowdsourcing; Hu et al. (2015) and Alaei et al. (2016) for crowdfund-
ing; Acemoglu et al. (2017), Feng et al. (2018), Garg and Johari (2018), and Papanastasiou et al.
(2018) for information crowdsourcing; and Asadpour et al. (2019), Freund et al. (2019), and Nyotta
et al. (2019) for crowdsourcing in transportation and urban mobility. Our work adds to the growing
collection of papers that focus specifically on nonprofit crowdsourcing platforms, with applications
as varied as educational crowdfunding (Song et al. 2018), disaster response (Han et al. 2019), and
smallholder supply chains (de Zegher et al. 2018, de Zegher and Lo 2019). Nonprofits often use
crowdsourcing in the absence of monetary incentives; in such settings, successful crowdsourcing
relies on efficient utilization and engagement of participants. We contribute to this literature by
designing online policies for effectively notifying volunteers while avoiding overutilization.
Online Matching and Prophet Inequalities: Abstracting away from the motivating appli-
cation, our work is related to the stream of papers on online stochastic matching and prophet
inequalities. Given the scope of this literature, we highlight only recent advances and kindly refer
the interested reader to Mehta et al. (2013) for an informative survey. A standard approach is to
design online policies based on an offline solution (see, e.g., Feldman et al. (2009), Haeupler et al.
(2011), Manshadi et al. (2012), Jaillet and Lu (2014), Wang et al. (2018), and Stein et al. (2019))
and to compare the performance of these policies to a benchmark such as the clairvoyant solution
described in Golrezaei et al. (2014). Our work builds on this approach by applying techniques from
prophet matching inequalities and the magician’s problem (Alaei et al. 2012, Alaei 2014). Further,
while the classic setting for online matching focuses on bipartite graphs in which one side is static
and the other side arrives online, a stream of recent papers (motivated by various applications)
study dynamic matching problems in non-bipartite graphs (Ashlagi et al. 2013, 2019a,b) or in
bipartite graphs where both sides arrive/leave over time (Johari et al. 2016, Aouad and Saritac
2019, Truong and Wang 2019, Castro et al. 2020). Our setup also deviates from the classic online
bipartite matching setting: even though the volunteers do not arrive online, they can be in two
states (active or inactive) which can be viewed as arrival/departure. In contrast with the afore-
mentioned papers, which all have an exogenous arrival/departure dynamic, volunteers’ states in
our setting are endogenously determined by decisions we make.
Our work also contributes to a growing literature on online allocation of reusable resources
(Dickerson et al. 2018, Besbes et al. 2019, Feng et al. 2019, Gong et al. 2019, Rusmevichientong
et al. 2020). In a novel setting, Besbes et al. (2019) studies pricing of reusable resources and shows
that static pricing achieves surprisingly good performance. The innovative works of Feng et al.
(2019), Gong et al. (2019), and Rusmevichientong et al. (2020) focus on online policies for resource
allocation and assortment planning, while Dickerson et al. (2018) designs an adaptive policy to
address an online stochastic matching problem in a setting with unit-capacity resources.
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We highlight three key ways in which our setting differs from the aforementioned papers. (i)
In our work, the platform’s objective function is non-linear. Despite that, we only consider offline
solutions that can be computed in polynomial time (as opposed to relying on an oracle).6 (ii)
Volunteers—which represent the resources in our setting—can become unavailable without being
matched (i.e., just through notification). (iii) We aim to develop parameterized lower and upper
bounds based on the minimum discrete hazard rate of the usage duration. Such an approach enables
us to gain insight into the impact of the characteristics of the usage duration distribution on the
achievable bounds.
These crucial differences present new technical challenges which require us to develop new ideas
in the design and analysis of our policies and as well as in setting a benchmark and computing
an ex ante solution. Additionally, though our SDN policy and the adaptive algorithm of Dickerson
et al. (2018) both rely on computing the probability that a resource is active, in our setting, we
show that we can compute and control these probabilities a priori in polynomial time (Lemma
2). In contrast, Dickerson et al. (2018) estimates such probabilities dynamically at each time step
via simulation. Computing such probabilities a priori gives our policy the advantage of avoiding
both estimation error and the burden of dynamic (real-time) computation. Our SN policy—which
exhibits significant numerical improvement over our SDN policy—relies on solving individual-level
DPs in order to sparsify an ex ante solution. The techniques used in the design and analysis of our
SN policy build on ideas in Alaei et al. (2012), Alaei (2014), and Feng et al. (2019). Further, our
results rely on a primal-dual analysis, which is a powerful technique that has been used in other
operational problems (see, e.g., Chen and Zhang (2016), Calmon et al. (2018), and DeValve et al.
(2020)).
3. Model
In this section, we formally introduce the online volunteer notification problem that a volunteer-
based crowdsourcing platform faces when deciding whom to notify for a task. As part of the
problem definition, we highlight the platform’s objective as well as the trade-off it faces due to the
volunteers’ adverse reactions to excessive notifications and the uncertainty in future tasks. Further,
we define the measure of competitive ratio and establish a benchmark against which we compare
the performance of any online policy.
The online volunteer notification problem consists of a set of volunteers, denoted by V, and a
set of task types, denoted by S.7 Volunteers (resp. task types) are indexed from 1 to |V|= V (resp.
|S|= S). Over T time steps, the platform solicits volunteers to complete a sequence of tasks. In
6 We highlight that Rusmevichientong et al. (2020) uses the optimal online policy as a benchmark.
7 For FRUS, a task represents a scheduled rescue (food donation) which has not been claimed in advance.
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particular, in each time step t, a task of type s arrives with known probability λs,t. We assume
at most one task arrives in each time step. Said differently, we assume
∑S
s=1 λs,t ≤ 1 and with
probability 1−∑Ss=1 λs,t := λ0,t, no task arrives. Arrivals are assumed to be independent across
time periods, but not within each time period since at most one task arrives per period.
Whenever a task arrives, the platform can notify volunteers. However, excessively notifying a
volunteer may lead her to suffer from notification fatigue. To model this behavior in a general form,
we assume that a volunteer can be in two possible states: active or inactive. In the former state, the
volunteer pays attention to the platform’s notifications, whereas in the latter state, she is inatten-
tive. Initially, each volunteer is active. However, after being notified (and potentially responding,
as described below) she transitions to the inactive state and will only become active again in Z > 0
periods, where Z is independently drawn from a known inter-activity time distribution denoted by
g(·). Mathematically, P (Z = τ) = g(τ).
Before proceeding, we point out that similar modeling assumptions have been made in previous
work. In particular, Ata et al. (2019) models volunteer staffing for gleaning and assumes once a
volunteer is utilized, she will go into a random repose period governed by an exponential distri-
bution. Similarly, McElfresh et al. (2019) focuses on blood donation and puts a constraint on the
frequency with which a volunteer can be notified, which is equivalent to assuming a deterministic
inter-activity time. The latter strategy is also practiced in many FRUS locations.
To capture the minimum rate at which volunteers transition from inactive to active, we define
the minimum discrete hazard rate of the inter-activity time distribution as follows:
Definition 1 (Minimum Discrete Hazard Rate). For a probability distribution g(·), the
minimum discrete hazard rate (MDHR) is given by q = minτ∈N
g(τ)
1−G(τ−1) , where G(·) denotes the
corresponding CDF.8
Note that a large value of q is a sufficient condition to ensure that volunteers’ activity level
is high. For example, if g(·) is a geometric distribution, q is the same as its success probability.
However, a small value of q does not imply inactive volunteers: if g(2) = 1, i.e., if the inter-activity
times are deterministic and equal to 2 periods, then q= 0 but volunteers are quite active.
When a donation arrives, the platform observes the donation type and must immediately and
irrevocably notify a subset of volunteers.9 If an active volunteer v is notified about a task of type
s, she will respond with match probability pv,s, independently from all other volunteers. Thus the
arriving task is completed if at least one notified volunteer responds.10 If a task of type s arrives
8 By convention, if the fraction is 0
0
, we define it to be equal to 1.
9 As explained in the introduction, the platform cannot expect prompt responses from volunteers and therefore
sequential notification is impractical.
10 For the remainder of the paper, when we say a volunteer “responds” we mean that the volunteer responds positively,
i.e., she is willing to complete the task.
Manshadi and Rodilitz: Efficient Volunteer Crowdsourcing 11
at time t and if the subset of volunteers that are both notified and active is given by U , then the
task will be completed with probability 1−∏v∈U(1− pv,s). We highlight that this probability is
monotone and submodular with respect to the set U . In Section 6, we describe how pv,s can be
estimated accurately in the FRUS setting by using historical data.
As mentioned earlier, all volunteers are initially active. The platform knows the arrival rates
λs,t, the match probabilities pv,s, and the inter-activity time distribution g(·), but it does not
observe volunteers’ states. For any instance I of the online volunteer notification problem where
I = ({λs,t : s ∈ [S], t ∈ [T ]},{pv,s : v ∈ [V ], s ∈ [S]}, g),11 the platform’s goal is to employ an online
policy that maximizes the expected number of completed tasks.
In order to evaluate an online policy, we compare its performance to that of a clairvoyant solution
that knows the entire sequence of arrivals in advance as well as volunteers’ states in each period.
However, the clairvoyant solution does not know before notifying a volunteer how long her period
of inactivity will be.12 Two observations enable us to upper bound the clairvoyant solution with
a polynomially-solvable program. First, note that if the clairvoyant solution notifies a subset of
volunteers U about a task of type s, the probability of completing that task is
1−
∏
v∈U
(1− pv,s)≤min
{∑
v∈U
pv,s,1
}
In words, we can upper bound the success probability of a subset U with a piecewise-linear
function that is the minimum of the expected total number of volunteer responses and 1. Second,
recall that inactive volunteers ignore notifications. Thus, we can assume that the clairvoyant solu-
tion only notifies active volunteers, who will then become inactive for a random amount of time
according the inter-activity distribution. As a consequence, we can upper bound the clairvoyant
solution via the program below, which we denote by (LP).
The decision variables xv,s,t represent the probability of notifying volunteer v when a task of type
s arrives at time t. Constraint (1) ensures that xv,s,t is a valid probability. Constraint (2) places
limits on the frequency with which volunteers can be notified according to the inter-activity time
distribution. In particular, note that constraint (2) can be written as
t∑
τ=1
S∑
s=1
λs,τxv,s,τ ≤ 1 +
t∑
τ=1
S∑
s=1
λs,τxv,s,τG(t− τ)
11 For ease of notation, for any a∈N, we use [a] to refer to the set {1,2, . . . , a}.
12 One can consider a more powerful clairvoyant who knows the realized duration of volunteers’ inactivity in advance.
However, no online policy can provide a constant factor guarantee compared to that solution. To see why, consider a
setting where V = 1, S = 1, p1,1 = 1, and λ1,t = 1 for all t∈ [T ]. Further, suppose the inter-activity time is equally likely
to be 1 or T . Knowing the realized inter-activity times, the clairvoyant solution can achieve T/2 (by only notifying
in periods where the inter-activity time is 1). However, no online policy could achieve more than 2 in expectation.
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The left hand side represents the expected total number of times a volunteer has been notified. We
now explain the right hand side of the inequality. Recall that any volunteer v is initially active.
Thus, the clairvoyant solution can notify her once. However, it will not notify volunteer v for the
second time until she returns to the active state. Repeating this for all subsequent notifications up
to time t shows that, in expectation, the clairvoyant solution must meet constraint (2).
LPI = maxx
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,tmin
{ V∑
v=1
xv,s,tpv,s,1
}
(LP)∗
s.t. 0≤ xv,s,t ≤ 1 ∀v, s, t (1)
1≥
t∑
τ=1
S∑
s=1
λs,τxv,s,τ (1−G(t− τ)) ∀v, t (2)
∗ With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to this program with a piecewise-linear objective as (LP). To
express the above program as a linear program, we would replace min{∑Vv=1 xv,s,tpv,s,1} with ∑Vv=1 xv,s,tpv,s
in the objective. Then, we would add one constraint for each s, t pair ensuring that
∑V
v=1 xv,s,tpv,s ≤ 1.
We highlight that no online policy can achieve the optimal objective of (LP), even for instances
with deterministic inter-activity times: consider an instance with V = 1, S = 2, and T = 2 where
λ1,1 = 1, λ2,2 = 0.5, p1,1 = 0.5, p1,2 = 1, and g(2) = 1, i.e., a deterministic inter-activity time of two
periods.13 Here no online policy can achieve better than 0.5;14 however, the optimal solution to
(LP) is 0.75.15
For ease of reference, in the following, we define the set of all feasible solutions to (LP). Such a
definition proves helpful in the rest of the paper.
Definition 2 (Feasible Set). For any x∈RV×S×T , x∈P if and only if it satisfies constraints
(1) and (2).
The following proposition, which we prove in Appendix A.1, establishes the relationship between
the clairvoyant solution and LPI :
Proposition 1 (Upper Bound on the Clairvoyant Solution). For any instance I of the
online volunteer notification problem, LPI is an upper bound on its clairvoyant solution.
13 In all the presented examples, we follow the convention that any model primitive not specified is 0, e.g., in this
example, λ1,2 = 0.
14 To see why, note that an online policy must decide whether or not to notify volunteer 1 in period 1 without knowing
whether or not a task arrives in period 2. If a policy notifies the volunteer in period 1, she will complete the task in
the first period with probability 0.5 and then not be active in period 2. If the volunteer is saved for period 2, a task
will only arrive with probability 0.5, which she will then complete with certainty.
15 To see why, note that x1,1,1 = 0.5 and x1,2,2 = 1 is feasible and achieves a value of 0.75. This corresponds to the
clairvoyant solution of notifying the volunteer in period 1 if and only if there is no arrival in period 2.
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In light of Proposition 1, we use LPI as a benchmark against which we compare the performance
of any policy. Consequently, we define the competitive ratio of an online policy as follows:
Definition 3 (Competitive Ratio). An online policy is c-competitive for the online volun-
teer notification problem if for any instance I, we have: POLI ≥ cLPI , where POLI represents
the expected number of completed tasks by the online policy for instance I.
We will use the competitive ratio as a way to quantify the performance of an online policy. For
each of our two policies (presented in the following section), the competitive ratio is parameterized
by the MDHR, q, and it improves as q increases.
4. Online Policies
In this section, we present and analyze two policies for the online volunteer notification problem.
Both policies are randomized and rely on a fractional solution we compute ex ante using the
instance primitives. Thus, we begin this section by introducing the ex ante solution in Section 4.1.
We then proceed to describe our policies and analyze their competitive ratios in Sections 4.2 and
4.3.
4.1. Ex Ante Solution
As stated in Section 1, both of our online policies rely on an ex ante solution which we denote
by x∗ ∈ [0,1]V×S×T . Given our benchmark, we focus our attention on solutions that are feasible in
(LP), i.e., x∗ ∈P (see Definition 2). Clearly, x∗LP—the solution to (LP) in Section 3—is a potential
ex ante solution. However, in practice, such a solution can prove ineffective because it does not
take into account the diminishing returns of notifying an additional volunteer about a task. As a
result, it may ignore some tasks while notifying an excessive number of volunteers about others
(e.g., see the discussion and examples in Appendix D).
Given any x ∈ P, for a moment, suppose volunteers are always active. Then if we notify each
volunteer independently according to x, the expected number of completed tasks would be:16
f(x) :=
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(
1−
V∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s)
)
. (3)
Because x∗LP is the optimal solution of a piecewise-linear objective, it ignores the submodularity
in f(x).17 In light of this intuition, we introduce two other candidates that can be computed in
polynomial time. First, we aim to find the feasible point that maximizes f(·). We denote this
optimization problem by (AA) which stands for Always Active. Even though AA is NP -hard (Bian
et al. 2017), simple polynomial-time algorithms such as the variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm
16 Since a task can only be completed if one arrives, we limit all sums to task types indexed from 1 to S.
17 We remark that we design our online policies such that they achieve a constant factor of f(x) as defined in (3).
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described below (proposed in Bian et al. (2017)) are known to work well in practice. The algorithm
iteratively maximizes a linearization of f(x) and returns an average of feasible solutions, which
therefore must be feasible. We denote the output of this algorithm by x∗AA and use it as another
candidate for the ex ante solution.
max
x∈P
f(x) (AA)
Approximating AA via Frank-Wolfe variant with step size 1/n:
1. Set x0 = 0.
2. For i from 1 to n:
(a) Solve yi = argmaxx∈P〈x,∇f(xi−1)〉
(b) Set xi = xi−1 + 1
n
yi
3. Return xn
Note that the expected number of completed tasks, as defined in (3), jointly depends on the
contributions of all volunteers. This property makes optimizing such an objective challenging.
Further, when assessing any online policy, jointly analyzing volunteers contribution while keeping
track of the joint distribution of their state (active or inactive) is prohibitively difficult.18 We
overcome this challenge by defining the following artificial priority scheme among volunteers which
enables us to “decouple” the contributions of volunteers and find our last candidate for the ex ante
solution.
Definition 4 (Index-Based Priority Scheme). Under the index-based priority scheme, if
multiple volunteers respond to a notification, the one with the smallest index completes the task.19
Following the index-based priority scheme allows us to define individual contributions for each
volunteer as shown in the following lemma (proven in Appendix B.1).
Lemma 1 (Volunteer Priority-Based Contributions). For any x ∈ [0,1]V×S×T , f(x) =∑V
v=1 fv(x) where f(·) is defined in (3) and
fv(x) :=
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(∏
u<v
(1− pu,sxu,s,t)
)
pv,sxv,s,t. (4)
Once again, suppose for a moment that volunteers are always active. Then for any v ∈ [V ], the
term
(∏
u<v(1− pu,sxu,s,t)
)
pv,sxv,s,t in (4) represents the probability that under the index-based
priority scheme, volunteer v is the lowest-indexed volunteer to respond positively to a notifica-
tion about a task of type s at time t. Further, this term only depends on the fractional solu-
tion of volunteers with lower index than v. Thus, if we treat xu,s,t as fixed for 1 ≤ u < v, then(∏
u<v(1− pu,sxu,s,t)
)
pv,sxv,s,t is linear in xv,s,t. In light of these observations, we define our last
candidate as the solution of a series of linear programs in which volunteers sequentially maximize
18 We remind that f(·) is the objective in the hypothetical case where all volunteers are always active.
19 Note that this priority scheme is without loss of generality, since in the online volunteer notification problem, all
active volunteers who receive a notification become inactive.
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their individual contributions in the order of their priority. This is summarized in the program
(SQ-v).
The separate but sequential nature of these programs leads to an efficiently-computable solution
which takes into account the diminishing returns from notifying multiple volunteers. To be specific,
for a given volunteer v, the program (SQ-v) uses the solutions from previous iterations denoted by
xSQu,s,t for u∈ [v− 1], s∈ [S], and t∈ [T ]. As a result, the objective of (SQ-v) is a linear function of
its decision variables, i.e., the xv,s,t variables. Thus, (SQ-v) is a linear program, and its objective
incorporates the externalities imposed by higher-ranked volunteers. We denote the solution to these
V sequential linear programs as x∗SQ.
20 Finally, we remark that the above decoupling idea proves
helpful in both the design and analysis of our online policies.
For v from 1 to V :
max
{xv,s,t:s∈[S],t∈[T ]}
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(∏
u<v
(1− pu,sxSQu,s,t)
)
pv,sxv,s,t (SQ-v)
subject to 0≤xv,s,t ≤ 1 ∀s, t
1≥
t∑
τ=1
S∑
s=1
λs,τxv,s,τ (1−G(t− τ)) ∀t
Having three candidates, we define
x∗ := argmaxx∈{x∗
LP
,x∗
AA
,x∗
SQ
}f(x) (5)
The following proposition, which we prove in Appendix B.2, establishes a lower bound on f(x∗)
based on the benchmark LP.
Proposition 2 (Lower Bound on Ex Ante Solution). For x∗ defined in (5),
f(x∗)≥ (1− 1
e
)LP.
The above worst case ratio is achieved by the ratio of f(x∗LP) to LP, and it is tight. However,
we stress that x∗AA and x
∗
SQ can provide significant improvements. A simple example illustrating
this point can be found in Appendix D, along with an example demonstrating that f(x∗LP) can be
strictly greater than f(x∗AA) and f(x
∗
SQ). These examples show that none of the three solutions is
universally dominant (or dominated); as such, we define x∗ to be the maximum of the three. When
testing our policies on FRUS data (as detailed in Section 6), we find that using x∗ instead of x∗LP
results in an average improvement of 12%.
20 The vector x∗SQ consists of variables x
SQ
u,s,t for u∈ [V ], s∈ [S], and t∈ [T ].
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We conclude this section by noting that an online policy which directly follows x∗ (i.e., a policy
that at time t, upon arrival of s, notifies volunteer v independently with probability x∗v,s,t) achieves
a competitive ratio of at most q, as shown in Proposition 3 in Section 5.2. This hardness result
stems from the fact that x∗ “respects” the inactivity period of volunteers only in expectation.
Consequently, under a policy of directly following x∗, it is possible that volunteers are inactive
when high-value tasks (e.g. tasks where the match probability is close to 1) arrive because they
were notified earlier (according to x∗) for low-value tasks.
Therefore, we develop two policies based on two different modifications of the ex ante solution:
(i) properly scaling it down and (ii) sparsifying it. The former guides our first policy which we
call the scaled-down notification policy, whereas the latter guides our second policy, referred to as
the sparse notification policy. These policies are described and analyzed in the next two sections,
respectively.
4.2. Scaled-Down Notification Policy
In this section, we present our scaled-down notification (SDN) policy which is a non-adaptive
randomized policy that independently notifies volunteers according to a predetermined set of prob-
abilities based on x∗. The policy relies on the following ideas: (i) fixing a policy, suppose we can
compute the ex ante probability that any volunteer v is active at time t when following that policy.
Let us denote such an ex ante probability by βv,t. Then if s arrives at time t, we notify v with
probability cx∗v,s,t/βv,t where c ∈ [0, βv,t/x∗v,s,t]. As a result, she will be active and notified with
probability cx∗v,s,t. (ii) If she was the only notified volunteer, then her probability of completing this
task would be simply cx∗v,s,tpv,s. Even though this is not the case, using the index-based priority
scheme and the contribution decoupling idea in Lemma 1, we can show her contribution will be
proportional to cx∗v,s,tpv,s. (iii) Consequently, we would like to set c as large as possible. However,
c cannot be larger than
βv,t
x∗v,s,t
since notification probabilities cannot exceed 1. Thus in the design
of the policy, we find the largest feasible c, which we prove to be 1/(2− q) where q is the MDHR
of the inter-activity time distribution (see Definition 1).
The formal definition of our policy is presented in Algorithm 1. In the rest of this section, we
analyze the competitive ratio of the SDN policy. Our main result is the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Competitive Ratio of the Scaled-Down Notification Policy). Suppose
the MDHR of the inter-activity time distribution is q. Then the scaled-down notification policy,
defined in Algorithm 1, is 1
2−q (1− 1e )-competitive.
We remark that Theorem 1 implies that the competitive ratio of our policy improves as q
increases. However, a larger value of q does not imply that the probability of notification is uniformly
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ALGORITHM 1: Scaled-Down Notification (SDN) Policy
Offline Phase:
1. Compute x∗ according to (5).
2. Set βv,1 = 1 and βv,t = 1−
∑t−1
t′=1
∑S
s=1 λs,t′
x∗
v,s,t′
2−q (1−G(t− t′)) for all v ∈ [V ], t∈ [T ] \ [1]
Online Phase:
1. For t∈ [T ]:
(a) If a task of type s arrives in time t, then for v in V :
i. Notify v with probability
x∗v,s,t
(2−q)βv,t
larger. If q increases, the ex ante solution as well as the ex ante probability of being active will also
change, both of which affect the notification probability.
The proof of Theorem 1 builds on the ideas described above and consists of several steps. First,
in the following lemma, we prove that for any v ∈ [V ] and t ∈ [T ], βv,t defined in Algorithm 1 is
indeed the probability that v is active at time t under the SDN policy and βv,t is at least
1
2−q .
21
Lemma 2 (Volunteer’s Active State Probability). For the SDN policy defined in Algo-
rithm 1, let Ev,t represent the event that volunteer v is active in period t. Then for all v ∈ [V ] and
all t∈ [T ], P (Ev,t) = βv,t. Further, βv,t ≥ 12−q .
Proof: We begin by proving that βv,t ≥ 12−q for all v ∈ [V ] and t∈ [T ]. Since we set βv,1 = 1, this
clearly holds for all v ∈ [V ] when t= 1. Without loss of generality, we will now focus on a particular
v ∈ [V ] and t∈ [T ] \ [1].
Starting from the definition of βv,t in Algorithm 1, we have:
βv,t = 1−
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t′
x∗v,s,t′
2− q (1−G(t− t
′))
= 1− 1
2− q
(
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′(1−G(t− t′− 1)− g(t− t′))
)
(6)
= 1− 1
2− q
(
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′(1−G(t− t′− 1))(1−
g(t− t′)
1−G(t− t′− 1))
)
(7)
≥ 1− 1
2− q
(
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′(1−G(t− t′− 1))(1− q)
)
(8)
≥ 1− 1− q
2− q (9)
=
1
2− q
21 We also highlight that computing βv,t for all v and t can be done in polynomial time.
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Line (6) simply follows by observing that G(t− t′) =G(t− t′ − 1) + g(t− t′). In the next line, we
factor out (1−G(t− t′−1)).22 Line (8) comes from applying the definition of the MDHR. Because
x∗ ∈P (see Definition 2), in line (9) we apply the bound given by constraint (2) for t− 1, namely,∑t−1
t′=1
∑S
s=1 λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′(1−G(t− t′− 1))≤ 1. This holds for any v ∈ [V ] and any t ∈ [T ] \ [1], which
implies that βv,t ≥ 12−q for all v ∈ [V ] and t∈ [T ].
We now use total induction to prove that P (Ev,t) = βv,t. For notation, we will use Ec to refer to
the complement of event E . At t= 1, we have P (Ev,t) = 1 and βv,t = 1 by definition. Now we assume
that βv,t = P (Ev,t) for all t ∈ [k]. We prove the claim for t= k+ 1 by computing P
(Ecv,k+1). To be
inactive at time k + 1, a volunteer must be active in some prior period t′ ∈ [k], must be notified
in t′, and must not become active again by time k+ 1. Thus, to compute the probability that a
volunteer is inactive at time k+ 1, we can sum the probabilities of k disjoint events:
P
(Ecv,k+1)= k∑
t′=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t′P (Ev,t′)
x∗v,s,t′
(2− q)βv,t′ (1−G(k+ 1− t
′))
Plugging in the inductive hypothesis that P (Ev,t′) = βv,t′ for t′ ∈ [k], we see that these terms cancel,
leaving us with
P
(Ecv,k+1)= k∑
t′=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t′
x∗v,s,t′
2− q (1−G(k+ 1− t
′)) (10)
Noting that this sum is definitionally equivalent to 1−βv,k+1 completes the proof. 
Next, utilizing the index-based priority scheme (in Definition 4) and the contribution decoupling
idea (in Lemma 1), we lower bound the contribution of each volunteer according to their priority
in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (Volunteer Priority-Based Contribution under the SDN Policy). Under
the index-based priority scheme (in Definition 4) and the SDN policy, for any x ∈ P, the contri-
bution of volunteer v ∈ [V ], i.e., the expected number of tasks she completes, is at least 1
2−qfv(x),
with fv(·) defined in (4).
Proof: First, we focus on a particular arrival s∈ [S] at a particular time t∈ [T ] and we show that
volunteer v ∈ [V ] completes the task with probability at least 1
2−q
(∏
u<v(1−x∗u,s,tpu,s)
)
x∗v,s,tpv,s.
Then we use linearity of expectations to finish the proof. Under an index-based priority scheme,
the probability that a volunteer v ∈ [V ] completes this task is equal to
P (v responds)P (no volunteer with lower index responds | v responds)
22 If 1−G(t− t′−1) = 0, then we must also have g(t− t′) = 0. Thus, in Line (7), we preserve the equality by following
our convention that if the fraction is 0
0
, we define it to be equal to 1.
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We start by computing the first term. By Lemma 2, volunteer v will be active at time t with
probability βv,t, and according to Algorithm 1, she will be notified with probability
x∗v,s,t
βv,t(2−q) . If
active, the volunteer will respond to a notification with probability pv,s. Since these events are all
independent, we have:
P (v responds) =
x∗v,s,t
(2− q)pv,s. (11)
We now bound the second term. First note that volunteers only respond if they are active, notified,
and match with the task. Volunteer u will be notified with probability
x∗u,s,t
βu,t(2−q) ≤ x∗u,s,t (the inequal-
ity holds because by Lemma 2, βu,t ≥ 12−q ). Further, volunteer u will match independently with
probability pu,s. These events are both independent of v responding. Thus, for any other volunteer
u,
P (u does not respond | v responds)≥ P (u not notified or does not match | v responds)
≥ 1−x∗u,s,tpu,s
Repeating the above argument jointly for all u < v, we can upper bound the probability that no
lower-indexed volunteers respond conditional on v responding as follows
P (no volunteer with lower index responds|v responds)
≥ P (∩u<v{u not notified or does not match}|v responds)≥
∏
u<v
(1−x∗u,s,tpu,s) (12)
Note that in the second inequality we use the fact that for any two volunteers u and u′ (where
u 6= u′), the events {u not notified or does not match} and {u′ not notified or does not match} are
independent from each other as well as from v responding. Combining (11) and (12) completes
our proof that for any arrival s ∈ [S] at time t ∈ [T ], volunteer v ∈ [V ] completes the task with
probability at least 1
2−q
(∏
u<v(1−x∗u,s,tpu,s)
)
x∗v,s,tpv,s. Using linearity of expectations, we compute
the expected number of tasks completed by v as follows
1
2− q
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(∏
u<v
(1−x∗u,s,tpu,s)
)
x∗v,s,tpv,s =
1
2− q fv(x
∗).
This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
To finish the proof of Theorem 1, note that Lemma 3 implies that each volunteer completes at
least 1
2−qfv(x
∗) tasks in expectation. By linearity of expectations and Lemma 1, the expected total
number of tasks completed by volunteers must be at least 1
2−qf(x
∗). Since f(x∗)≥ (1− 1
e
)LPI (see
Proposition 2), it immediately follows that the SDN policy is 1
2−q (1− 1e )-competitive. 
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4.3. Sparse Notification Policy
In this section, we present our second policy, the sparse notification (SN) policy, which relies on
a different modification of the ex ante solution. Before describing the policy, we briefly discuss
our motivation for designing a second policy. Though simple and intuitive, the SDN policy only
relies on the ex ante solution to resolve the trade-off between the immediate reward of notifying a
volunteer and saving her for a future arrival. Rather than considering each decision individually,
the SDN policy simply adjusts the ex ante solution on an aggregate level; even in the last period
T , the SDN policy follows a scaled-down version of x∗ despite getting no benefit from saving a
volunteer for a future arrival. As a result, it exhibits performance only slightly above its worst-case
guarantee (see the example in Section 5.2 and the results in Section 6).
To more accurately resolve this trade-off, in designing the SN policy, we utilize the ex ante
solution and the index-based priority scheme (see Definition 4) to formulate a sequence of one-
dimensional DPs whose optimal value will serve as a lower bound on the contribution of each
volunteer according to her priority (as shown in Lemma 4). The solution of these DPs is a sparsified
version of the ex ante solution x∗. Namely, let us denote x˜ as the solution of the sequence of DPs.
For any v, s, and t, x˜v,s,t is either 0 or x
∗
v,s,t. Equipped with x˜, which we compute in advance,
the SN policy probabilistically follows x˜ in the online phase. Our DP formulation and its analysis
builds on the framework developed in Alaei et al. (2012) and Alaei (2014), which is also used in
Feng et al. (2019).
Next we describe the DP formulation. Consider volunteer v ∈ [V ] and suppose we have already
solved the first (v − 1) DPs. Thus we have {x˜u,s,t : u ∈ [v − 1], s ∈ [S], t ∈ [T ]}. Let us denote the
value-to-go of the DP at time t by Jv,t. As mentioned above, we define the DP such that Jv,t is a
lower bound on the expected number of tasks that volunteer v will complete between t and T when
active at time t under the SN policy and the index-based priority scheme (we prove this assertion
in Lemma 4). Clearly Jv,T+1 = 0. To specify Jv,t for t ∈ [T ], we first define v’s reward at time t
when active and notified about a task of type s as follows:
rv,s,t := pv,s
v−1∏
u=1
(1− x˜u,s,tpu,s)23 (13)
The actions available when a task of type s arrives at time t are to notify v with probability x∗v,s,t
or to not notify v. Thus when deciding on the optimal action (which can be either 0 or x∗v,s,t), we
compare the (current and future) reward of notifying v now to the reward of saving her for the
next period. Formally,
x˜v,s,t = x
∗
v,s,tI
(
rv,s,t +
T∑
τ=t+1
g(τ − t)Jv,τ ≥ Jv,t+1
)
(14)
23 We emphasize that this is not the actual reward, i.e., it is not the probability that volunteer v completes a task of
type s under the index-based priority scheme. However, it is a lower bound, as shown in the proof of Lemma 4.
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The term in the indicator on the left hand side is the reward of notifying v in the current period
t, which consists of two parts: (i) the immediate reward we get from notifying v—which will make
her inactive for Z periods—and (ii) the future reward once she becomes active again. The right
hand side within the indicator simply represents the reward when v is not notified and remains
active in period t+ 1.
Given (13), (14), and Jv,T+1 = 0, we can iteratively compute {Jv,t; t∈ [T ]} as follows:24
Jv,t =
S∑
s=0
λs,t
(
(1− x˜v,s,t)Jv,t+1 + x˜v,s,t
(
rv,s,t +
T∑
τ=t+1
g(τ − t)Jv,τ
))
(15)
The formal definition of our policy is presented in Algorithm 2. In the rest of this section, we
analyze the competitive ratio of the SN policy. Our main result is the following theorem:
ALGORITHM 2: Sparse Notification (SN) Policy
Offline Phase:
1. Compute x∗ according to (5)
2. For all v ∈ [V ]:
(a) For all s∈ [S] and t∈ [T ], compute rv,s,t according to (13)
(b) Set Jv,T+1 = 0
(c) For t= T to t= 1 :
i. For all s∈ [S], compute x˜v,s,t according to (14)
ii. Compute Jv,t according to (15)
Online Phase:
1. For t from 1 to T :
(a) If a task of type s arrives in time t, then for v in V :
i. Notify v with probability x˜v,s,t
Theorem 2 (Competitive Ratio of the Sparse Notification Policy). Suppose that the
MDHR of the inter-activity time distribution is q. Then the sparse notification policy, defined in
Algorithm 2, is 1
2−q (1− 1e )-competitive.
A few remarks are in order: (i) The competitive ratio of our two policies are identical, implying
that in the worst case they guarantee the same performance. However, for practical instances, the
SN policy performs significantly better (as shown by instance I3 in Section 5.2 and the numerical
results in Section 6). Intuitively, this is because the design of the SN policy makes individualized
24 To compute the value-to-go at time t, we must sum over all possible arrivals, including tasks of type 0 (i.e., no
task). By convention, we set variables associated with tasks of type 0 (e.g. xv,0,t) to be 0.
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decisions explicitly intended to optimally resolve the trade-off between notifying a volunteer now or
keeping her active for later based on x∗. On the other hand, the design of the SDN policy aims to
uniformly scale down x∗. As a result, the SDN policy’s numerical performance is not substantially
better than its worst-case guarantee. (ii) The (identical) competitive ratio of both policies improves
when q increases. However, in contrast to the SDN policy, the SN policy does not directly make
use of q.
The proof of Theorem 2 consists of two main lemmas. First, in the following lemma, we lower
bound the contribution of each volunteer v by Jv,1:
Lemma 4 (Volunteer Priority-Based Contribution under the SN Policy). Under the
index-based priority scheme (in Definition 4) and the SN policy, the contribution of volunteer
v ∈ [V ], i.e., the expected number of tasks she completes, is at least Jv,1, where Jv,1 is defined in
(15).
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4 consists of two parts. Part (i): First, we prove that rv,s,t is a
lower bound on the probability that a volunteer v ∈ [V ] completes a task of type s ∈ [S] when
it arrives at time t ∈ [T ], conditional on being notified and active, under the SN policy and the
index-based priority scheme. Part (ii): Then we show that the expected number of tasks volunteer
v will complete between t and T when active at t under the SN policy and the index-based priority
scheme must be at least Jv,t.
Proof of Part (i): Without loss of generality, we focus on a particular arrival s at a particular
time t. Let us define rˆv,s,t as the probability that volunteer v completes a task of type s when it
arrives at time t, conditional on v being notified and active at time t, under the SN policy and
the index-based priority scheme. We will show that rv,s,t as defined in (13) is a lower bound on
rˆv,s,t. When notified and active, a volunteer v ∈ [V ] responds with probability pv,s. Any other
lower-indexed volunteer u∈ [v− 1] is notified with probability x˜u,s,t under the SN policy. If active,
she will respond with probability pu,s. Since these are both independent from v’s response, the
probability that u responds conditional on v responding must be less than x˜u,s,tpu,s. Repeating this
argument jointly for all u< v, we see that rˆv,s,t, i.e., the probability that v completes the task when
active and notified—which happens when she is the lowest indexed volunteer to respond—must be
at least pv,s
∏v−1
u=1(1− x˜u,s,tpu,s). Noting that this is equivalent to the definition of rv,s,t completes
the first part of the proof, namely that rˆv,s,t ≥ rv,s,t.
Proof of Part (ii): Let us define Jˆv,t as the expected number of tasks v will complete between
t and T when active at t under the SN policy and the index-based priority scheme. We will show
via total backward induction that Jˆv,t ≥ Jv,t. Clearly, this is true with equality for Jˆv,T+1 = 0.
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Now suppose that this inductive hypothesis holds for all t ≥ k + 1. We will show that for t = k,
Jˆv,k ≥ Jv,k. By construction, we have
Jˆv,k =
S∑
s=0
λs,k
(
(1− x˜v,s,k)Jˆv,k+1 + x˜v,s,k(rˆv,s,k +
T∑
τ=k+1
g(τ − k)Jˆv,τ )
)
In words, the expected number of tasks v will complete between t and T when active at t under
the SN policy and the index-based priority scheme can be computed in the following way: fixing
an arrival of a task of type s at time k, if v is not notified, she will complete Jˆv,k+1 tasks (in
expectation) in the future. If v is notified, she will complete this task with probability rˆv,s,k. The
expected number of tasks she will complete in the future is the expected number of tasks she will
complete after becoming active again, as given by the term
∑T
τ=k+1 g(τ −k)Jˆv,τ . Summing over all
possible arriving task types s ∈ [S]∪{0}, we get Jˆv,k. Using our inductive hypothesis and part (i)
of the proof, we have
Jˆv,k ≥
S∑
s=0
λs,k
(
(1− x˜v,s,k)Jv,k+1 + x˜v,s,k(rv,s,k +
T∑
τ=k+1
g(τ − k)Jv,τ )
)
(16)
Noting that the right hand side of (16) is exactly the definition of Jv,k according to (15), we have
shown Jˆv,k ≥ Jv,k, which completes the proof by induction.
This implies that the expected number of tasks volunteer v will complete between 1 and T when
active at period 1 under the SN policy and the index-based priority scheme must be at least Jv,1.
Because v is by definition active in period 1, we have completed the proof of Lemma 4. 
The second main step in the proof of Theorem 2 is to compare Jv,1 to the benchmark LP. In order
to do so, we follow the dual-fitting approach of Alaei et al. (2012). In particular, given the inter-
activity time distribution, we set up a linear program to find the “worst” possible combination of
per-stage rewards that give rise to the minimum possible value of Jv,1. Finding the optimal solution
to this LP proves to be difficult. Instead we find a feasible solution to its dual, which enables us to
lower bound Jv,1. The LP and its dual are presented in Table 1. In the LP formulation, the first two
sets of constraints follow from the DP definition. Note that the value of Jv,1 will crucially depend
on the values of per-stage rewards through
∑T
t=1
∑S
s=0 λs,trv,s,tx
∗
v,s,t, e.g., if rv,s,t = 0 for all v ∈ [V ],
s ∈ [S], and t ∈ [T ], then Jv,1 = 0. This motivates the final constraint, which provides a constant
against which we can compare Jv,1. The following lemma establishes a lower bound on Jv,1.
Lemma 5 (Lower Bounding the Dynamic Program). Under the index-based priority
scheme (see Definition 4), for any x ∈ P and volunteer v ∈ [V ], we have Jv,1 ≥ 12−qfv(x) where
fv(x) is defined in (4).
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Table 1 The linear and dual programs used to provide a lower bound on Jv,1 for all v ∈ [V ].
(J-LP) uses variables J = {Jv,t : t∈ [T ]} (Dual) uses variables α= {αt ≥ 0 : t∈ [T ]},
and r = {rv,s,t : s∈ [S], t∈ [T ]}. γ = {γt ≥ 0 : t∈ [T ]}, and µ.
minJ,r Jv,1 (J-LP) maxα,γ,µ cµ (Dual)
s.t. s.t.
Jv,t ≥ Jv,t+1 (αt) γ1 ≤ 1−α1 (Jv,1)
Jv,t ≥ Jv,t+1 +
∑S
s=0 λs,tx
∗
v,s,t γt ≤ γt−1 +αt−1−αt−
[rv,s,t−Jv,t+1+ γt−1
∑S
s=0 λs,t−1x
∗
v,s,t−1+∑T
τ=t+1 g(τ − t)Jv,τ )] (γt)
∑t−1
t′=1 γt′
∑S
s=0 λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′g(t− t′) (Jv,2:T )
c=
∑T
t=1
∑S
s=0 λs,trv,s,tx
∗
v,s,t (µ) γt ≥ µ (r)
Proof: First we show that for a particular volunteer v ∈ [V ], the solution to (J-LP) is a lower
bound on Jv,1 for a given value of
∑T
t=1
∑S
s=0 λs,trv,s,tx
∗
v,s,t. To see this, we show that the first two
sets of constraints in (J-LP) come from the definition of Jv,t:
Jv,t =
S∑
s=0
λs,t max
xv,s,t∈{0,x∗v,s,t}
{(1−xv,s,t)Jv,t+1 +xv,s,t(rv,s,t +
T∑
τ=t+1
g(τ − t)Jv,τ )}
≥max{Jv,t+1,
S∑
s=0
[
λs,t(1−x∗v,s,t)Jv,t+1 +x∗v,s,t(rv,s,t +
T∑
τ=t+1
g(τ − t)Jv,τ )
]
} (17)
= max{Jv,t+1, Jv,t+1 +
S∑
s=0
λs,tx
∗
v,s,t(rv,s,t−Jv,t+1 +
T∑
τ=t+1
g(τ − t)Jv,τ )} (18)
In the above, the first equality follows from the definition of x˜v,s,k. The inequality in (17) follows
from setting the values of xv,s,k to their extremes, i.e., xv,s,k = 0 (which gives the first term inside
the max) and xv,s,t = x
∗
v,s,t (which gives the second term inside the max). The last equality is a
result of simplifying the second term inside the max. Note that (18) implies that the first two
constraints in (J-LP) must hold.
The final constraint in (J-LP) scales the per-stage rewards while allowing for the “worst” possible
combination. Together there are 2T +1 constraints, which will become the dual variables identified
by the labels α= {αt ≥ 0 : t∈ [T ]}, γ = {γt ≥ 0 : t∈ [T ]}, and µ, respectively, in Table 1. This leads
to the dual program in (Dual).
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Next, we show that the following is a feasible solution to this dual problem: µ = 1
2−q and all
constraints are tight, i.e. γt = µ for all t∈ [T ], α1 = 1−µ, and for t≥ 2,
αt = αt−1 + γt−1− γt− γt−1
S∑
s=0
λs,t−1x
∗
v,s,t−1 +
t−1∑
t′=1
γt′
S∑
s=0
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′g(t− t′)
= αt−1−µ
(
S∑
s=0
λs,t−1x
∗
v,s,t−1−
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=0
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′g(t− t′)
)
(19)
= α1−µ
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=0
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′(1−G(t− t′)) (20)
= α1−µ
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=0
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′(1−G(t− 1− t′))(1−
g(t− t′)
1−G(t− 1− t′)) (21)
≥ α1−µ
t−1∑
t′=1
S∑
s=0
λs,t′x
∗
v,s,t′(1−G(t− 1− t′))(1− q) (22)
≥ α1− (1− q)µ (23)
= 1− (2− q)µ
Equality in Line (19) follows from plugging in γt = µ for all t. Line (20) comes from recursively
plugging in the definition for αt−1 and rearranging terms. Line (21) is a result of re-writing (1−
G(t− t′)) as (1−G(t− t′−1)−g(t− t′)) and then factoring out (1−G(t− t′−1)).25 Line (22) comes
from applying the definition of the minimum hazard rate. Line (23) uses the fact that x∗ ∈ P,
which means it must satisfy constraint (2) of (LP) at time t− 1.
Finally, note that in this proposed solution, all the dual variables are non-negative: 0≤ q ≤ 1,
which ensures µ= 1
2−q ∈ [1/2,1]. Thus γt = µ≥ 0, and α1 ≥ 0. Since µ= 12−q , we must have αt ≥ 0
Since all constraints are tight and for all t∈ [T ], αt ≥ 0 and γt ≥ 0, this solution is feasible in (Dual).
Therefore, by weak duality, we have
Jv,1 ≥ 1
2− q c=
1
2− q
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=0
λs,trv,s,tx
∗
v,s,t (24)
To finish the proof, we show that rv,s,t ≥
(∏
u<v(1− pu,sx∗u,s,t)
)
pv,s. To see why, note that the
term
(∏
u<v(1− pu,sxu,s,t)
)
pv,s is decreasing in xu,s,t. Since x˜u,s,t ≤ x∗u,s,t, this implies rv,s,t ≥(∏
u<v(1− pu,sx∗u,s,t)
)
pv,s. Plugging this back into (24), we have:
Jv,1 ≥ 1
2− q
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=0
λs,t
(∏
u<v
(1− pu,sx∗u,s,t)
)
pv,sx
∗
v,s,t = fv(x
∗),
which completes the proof of Lemma 5. 
25 If 1−G(t− t′−1) = 0, then we must also have g(t− t′) = 0. Thus, in Line (21), we preserve the equality by following
our convention that if the fraction is 0
0
, we define it to be equal to 1.
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Based on Lemma 5, we know that each volunteer completes at least 1
2−qfv(x
∗) tasks in expecta-
tion. By linearity of expectations and Lemma 1, the expected total number of tasks completed by
volunteers must be at least 1
2−qf(x
∗). Since f(x∗)≥ (1− 1
e
)LPI (see Proposition 2), it immediately
follows that the SN policy is 1
2−q (1− 1e )-competitive. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Having analyzed the competitive ratio of our two policies, we finish this section by computing
and comparing their complexities in the following remark.
Remark 1 (Computational Complexity of SDN and SN Policies). First, we note that
because both policies are non-adaptive, all of the computation can be done in advance. Next, we
claim that the computational complexities of our policies are nearly identical: to see this, observe
both policies require computing the same ex ante solution. Given an ex ante solution, the steps
in the SDN policy (Algorithm 1) have complexity of O(V ST 2), while the steps in the SN policy
(Algorithm 2) have complexity of O(V ST 2 + V 2ST ).26 Finally, we remark that computing the ex
ante solution according to (5), which is a common step shared by both policies, requires comparing
three candidates: x∗LP,x
∗
AA, and x
∗
SQ. These ex ante candidates require solving 1, n, and V linear
programs, respectively, where 1
n
is the step size of the Frank-Wolfe variant used to compute x∗AA.
These linear programs consist of V ST , V ST , and ST variables, respectively, and T (S+V +V S),
T (V +V S), and T (1 +S) constraints.
5. Upper Bounds on Competitive Ratio
In this section, we provide upper bounds on the achievable performance of various policies for the
online volunteer notification problem. We begin in Section 5.1 by upper-bounding the competitive
ratio of any online policy. Then, in Section 5.2, we place an upper bound on the competitive ratio
of the specific policy of directly following the ex ante solution as defined in (5). The instance which
establishes this upper bound also provides intuition for why the SN policy can outperform the SDN
policy.
5.1. Upper Bound for Any Online Policy
Like the lower bound achieved by our policies in Section 4, the upper bound we establish for
any online policy is parameterized by the MDHR of the inter-activity time distribution, q. We
highlight that our upper bound applies to all online policies, even those that cannot be computed
in polynomial time. The main result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Upper Bound on Achievable Competitive Ratio). Suppose the MDHR of
the inter-activity time distribution is q where q ∈ [1/16,1] ∪ {1/n,n ∈ N} ∪ {0}. Then no online
policy can achieve a competitive ratio greater than κ, where for q > 0
κ= min
{ 1
2− q ,1 + q−
q(1− q)
log( 1
1−q )(1 + q)
(1− e−1)
}
(25)
26 For two functions d, l :N→R, l(n) =O(d(n)) if lim supn→∞ |l(n)|d(n) <∞.
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Figure 2 Comparing the (identical) competitive ratio of both policies presented in Section 4 (Theorems 1 and
2) to an upper bound on the performance of any online policy (Theorem 3) as a function of the MDHR, q.
and for q= 0, we have κ= 1
2
.27
Figure 2 provides a summary of our lower and upper bounds on the achievable competitive ratio
for the online volunteer notification problem as a function of q. We make the following observations
based on the theorem and accompanying plot: (i) both the upper and lower bounds improve as q
increases, and (ii) the competitive ratio of our online policies are fairly close to the upper bound
when q is small but positive. However, the gap grows for larger values of q.
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on analyzing the following two instances, each giving one of
the terms in the definition of κ as shown in (25). Instance I1 attains the minimum when q ∈
{0}∪ [1/16,1) whereas instance I2 attains it when q ∈ {1/n,n > 16, n∈N}.28
Instance I1: Suppose V = 1, S = 2, T = 2, and and g(·) is the geometric distribution with
parameter q, e.g. g(τ) = q(1− q)τ−1. The arrival probabilities are given by λ1,1 = 1 and λ2,2 = 1−q ,
where  << 1−q. The volunteer match probabilities are given by p1,1 =  and p1,2 = 1. The left panel
of Figure 3 visualizes instance I1. The following lemma—which we prove in Appendix C.1—states
that no online policy can complete more than a 1
2−q fraction of LPI1 .
Lemma 6 (Upper Bound for Instance I1). In instance I1, the expected number of completed
tasks under any online policy is at most 1
2−qLPI1 for q ∈ [0,1).
27 We remark that the condition imposed on q when 0< q < 1/16 is added for ease of presentation of the theorem
statement as well as its proof. Relaxing the aforementioned condition amounts to modifying the second term in κ by
rounding any q up to the closest qˆ ∈ {1/n,n ∈ N} and slightly modifying the instance in the proof. We omit these
details for the sake of brevity.
28 For q= 1, by definition no online policy can achieve a competitive ratio greater than 1.
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Figure 3 Left: Visualization of instance I1. Middle: Visualization of instance I2. Right: Visualization of
instance I3.
Before proceeding to the second instance, we make two remarks: (i) If q= 0, the above instance
is equivalent to the canonical instance used in the prophet inequality to establish an upper bound
of 1/2 (see, e.g., Hill and Kertz (1992)). (ii) The term (1− 1/e) in the competitive ratio of both
policies corresponds to the gap between f(x∗) (defined in (3)) and the benchmark LP, whereas
the 1
2−q corresponds to the gap between the performance of our online policy and f(x
∗) due to the
loss in the online phase. In instance I1, there is only one volunteer and consequently f(x∗) = LPI1 .
Therefore, instance I1 shows that the lower bound achieved in the online phase of our policies is
tight, as they both attain at least 1
2−qf(x
∗).
The construction of our second instance is more delicate as it aims to find an instance for which
both the loss in the offline phase (i.e., the gap between f(x∗) and LPI) and the loss in the online
phase (i.e., the gap between the performance of the online policy and f(x∗)) are large.
Instance I2: Suppose V = 1q = n, S = 1, T = n2 + 1, and g(·) is the geometric distribution with
parameter q, e.g. g(τ) = q(1− q)τ−1. The arrival probabilities are given by λ1,1 = 1 and λ1,t = q
for t ∈ [T ] \ [1]. The volunteers are homogeneous with pv,1 = q for all v ∈ [V ]. The middle panel of
Figure 3 visualizes instance I2. The following lemma—which is proven in Appendix C.2—states
that no online policy can complete more than a 1 + q− q(1−q)
log( 11−q )(1+q)
(1− e−1) fraction of LPI2 .
Lemma 7 (Upper Bound for Instance I2). In instance I2, the expected number of completed
tasks under any online policy is at most
[
1+q− q(1−q)
log( 11−q )(1+q)
(1−e−1)
]
LPI2 , where q ∈ {1/n,n∈N}.
The proof of this lemma involves three steps: (i) placing a lower bound on LPI2 by finding a
feasible solution, (ii) establishing that always notifying every volunteer is the best online policy,
and (iii) assessing the performance of this policy relative to LPI2 . A full proof can be found in
Appendix C.2.
5.2. Upper Bound on Following Ex Ante Solution
As noted in Section 4.1, a policy of directly following the ex ante solution x∗ (as defined in (5))
does not achieve a good competitive ratio because volunteers are not always active at the “right
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time” if notifications only respect their inactivity period in expectation. To highlight this intuition,
we state the following proposition which establishes an upper bound on the performance of the
aforementioned policy.
Proposition 3 (Upper Bound on Performance of Following Ex Ante Solution).
Suppose the MDHR of the inter-activity time distribution is q > 0. Then the policy of directly
following the ex ante solution achieves a competitive ratio of at most q.
Proof: In order to prove this proposition, we construct an instance with a single volunteer such
that, under the policy of directly following the ex ante solution, she is likely to be inactive when
she is most valuable. In particular, we define instance I3 as follows:
Instance I3: Suppose V = 1, S = 2, T = 2, and g(·) is the geometric distribution with parameter
q, e.g. g(τ) = q(1− q)τ−1. The arrival probabilities are given by λ1,1 = 1 and λ2,2 = q. The volunteer
match probabilities are given by p1,1 =  and p1,2 = 1, where  << q. The right panel of Figure 3
visualizes instance I3. In the rest of the proof, we show that for instance I3, the expected number
of completed tasks when directly following the ex ante solution is qLPI3 .
We first claim that the ex ante solution in instance I3 is x∗1,1,1 = 1 and x∗1,2,2 = 1. Note that
such a solution is feasible in (LP), and because the objective of (LP) is monotonically increasing
in x1,1,1, x1,2,2 ∈ [0,1], no other feasible solution can achieve a higher value. As a consequence,
LPI3 = + q.
An online policy of following x∗ (the ex ante solution) is therefore equivalent to always notifying
volunteer 1 when there is an arrival. Such a policy completes a task in the first period with
probability  and a task in the second period with probability q2 (note that she will become active
in period 2 with probability q and there will be an arrival of type 2 independently with probability
q). The expected number of tasks completed is then given by q(1 + (1−q)
q(q+)
)LPI3 . For  << q, this
corresponds to a competitive ratio of q. 
We remark that instance I3 (defined in the proof of Proposition 3) also provides an example
where the SDN policy performs only half as well as the SN policy when q << 1. To show this, we
first demonstrate that under the SDN policy, the volunteer is active and notified with probability
1
2−q in both periods. This implies that she completes
1
2−qf1(x
∗) tasks in expectation, which is
exactly the lower bound established in Lemma 3.
Because x∗1,1,1 = 1 and β1,1 = 1, the SDN policy will notify volunteer 1 at time 1 with probability
1
2−q . Because x
∗
1,2,2 = 1, when a task of type 2 arrives at time 2, the SDN policy will notify her
with probability 1
(2−q)β1,2 . According to Lemma 2, she will be active in period 2 independently with
probability β1,2. Thus, the SDN policy achieves a value of

2−q + qβ1,2
1
(2−q)β1,2 =
1
2−qLPI3 .
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On the other hand, we show that the SN policy performs nearly twice as well by not notifying
the volunteer in period 1 and instead saving her for period 2. (i.e., x˜1,1,1 = 0 and x˜1,2,2 = 1) To
see this, note that the SN policy solves a DP starting from J1,3 = 0. Working backwards, the DP
solution for period 2 is x˜1,2,2 = 1 and J1,2 = q. To evaluate the DP solution for period 1, we note that
r1,1,1 + q
2 = + q2 ≤ J1,2, assuming q < 1 and  is chosen to be sufficiently small. Thus, x˜1,1,1 = 0, so
the SN policy does not notify the volunteer in period 1. Instead, she is saved for period 2, where she
completes a task with probability q. Thus, the expected number of completed tasks under the SN
policy is q
q+
LPI3 . Comparing this to the SDN policy, which completes
1
2−qLPI3 tasks, we observe
that for  << q << 1, we have q
q+
≈ 2( 1
2−q ).
We conclude this section by noting that instance I3 also highlights the challenges that the
reactivation of volunteers brings to the design of online policies for our online volunteer notification
problem compared to the classic online matching setting—in which once a resource is matched,
it will not return. In particular, papers such as Haeupler et al. (2011) show that for the classic
online matching setting, relying on an ex ante solution leads to constant-factor competitive ratios.
However, instance I3 shows that this is not the case when volunteers can reactivate. In other
words, generalizing online stochastic matching (by allowing for the return of resources) comes with
technical challenges that require us to employ new design ideas, as demonstrated in the SDN and
SN policies.
6. Evaluating Policy Performance on FRUS Data
In this section, we use data from FRUS to evaluate the performance of the two online policies
described in Section 4. First, we briefly explain how we use data to determine the model primi-
tives. Then we exhibit the superior performance of our policies compared to different benchmarks,
including policies that resemble the strategies used at various FRUS locations, when planning over
a six-week horizon.
Estimating model primitives: As explained in Section 3, in order to define an instance of
the online volunteer notification problem, we must determine the match probabilities, i.e., {pv,s :
v ∈ [V ], s ∈ [S]}; the arrival rates of tasks, i.e., {λs,t : s ∈ [S], t ∈ [T ]}; and the inter-activity time
distribution g(·).
Match probabilities: As evidenced in Figure 1, volunteer preferences over task types are
heterogeneous and predictable. To come up with estimates {pˆv,s : v ∈ [V ], s ∈ [S]} for each
FRUS location, we first create a feature vector for each task. We then build a k-Nearest
Neighbors classification model, tuning the parameter k using cross-validation. The AUC values
of such classification models range between 0.85 and 0.95 across tested locations.
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Figure 4 The left plot shows the fraction of LP achieved in Location (a) by our policies and three heuristics
assuming a deterministic inter-activity time. The plots in the middle and right, respectively, do the same for
Locations (b) and (c).
Arrival Rates: Recall that for FRUS, a task is a food rescue (donation) that remains avail-
able on the day of delivery. We define a set of task types based on pick-up and drop-off
location, day-of-week, and time-of-day. Most food rescues repeat on a weekly cycle, and using
a logistic regression model based on type and historical sign-up patterns, we can make accu-
rate predictions about whether such rescues will be available on the day of delivery. The AUC
values of these logistic regression models range between 0.78 and 0.96 across tested regions
when making predictions over a six-week horizon.29
Inter-activity time distribution: At FRUS, many site directors follow a policy of waiting
at least a week before notifying the same volunteer about another last-minute food rescue.
Many other volunteer notification systems operate under similar self-imposed restrictions on
notification frequency, such as notifications about blood donation studied in McElfresh et al.
(2019). Consequently, for the results reported in Figure 4, we assume the inter-activity time is
deterministic and equal to seven days, i.e., g(τ) = I(τ = 7). As discussed in the introduction,
our online volunteer notification problem—which amounts to jointly optimizing notifications
across all volunteers—is computationally intractable even in settings with deterministic inter-
activity times, justifying the need for simple policies with performance guarantees (see also
our related discussion and example after the introduction of (LP)).
In the following, we compare the performance of our online policies to several benchmarks, includ-
ing a strategy that simulates the current practice at various FRUS locations. We use instances
constructed with data from three different locations as described above. Whenever a task arrives,
FRUS site directors tend to notify a small subset of volunteers, chosen haphazardly among ‘eligible’
volunteers. We simulate this common practice with a ‘notify-random-n’ heuristic that notifies n
29 In Appendix E, we present numerical results that demonstrate the robustness of our policies in the presence of
error in estimating the above model primitives.
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volunteers chosen uniformly at random among eligible volunteers. Because site directors usually
follow the practice of waiting at least a week before notifying the same volunteer again, a volunteer
is considered eligible if she has not been notified for at least 6 days. We remark that the subset
of such eligible volunteers perfectly coincides with the subset of active volunteers when the inter-
activity time distribution is deterministic, i.e., when we set g(τ) = I(τ = 7). This highlights that
our framework perfectly captures the current practice. In addition to the commonly-used heuristic
described above, we compare our policies to two stronger, data-driven heuristics. First, we consider
a ‘notify-best-n’ heuristic that greedily notifies the n eligible volunteers with the largest match-
ing probabilities, i.e., the highest values of pv,s. We also simulate an adaptive ‘rolling horizon’
heuristic that solves a one-week version of (LP) for eligible volunteers whenever a task arrives and
probabilistically follows that solution.
Figure 4 displays the ratio between each policy and LPI across 25 simulations. We highlight
that the SN policy displays remarkable consistency, significantly outperforming the current FRUS
practice which is represented by the ‘notify-random-n’ heuristic. In addition, the SN policy signif-
icantly outperforms the two stronger heuristics in at least one location (e.g., Location (c)) while
always performing at least as well.30 Further note that the SN policy’s performance significantly
exceeds its competitive ratio of 1
2
(1− 1
e
), as given in Theorem 2, while the performance of the SDN
policy is closer to its competitive ratio.31
Moving beyond the common practice at FRUS—which coincides with our setting when the inter-
activity time distribution is deterministic—we note that our policies provide broader guarantees
for a general inter-activity time distribution. As such, we also study their numerical performance
when faced with stochastic inter-activity times. One natural choice to study is the geometric
distribution, which is assumed for the model of volunteer inter-activity time in previous work such
as Ata et al. (2019). To that end, in Figure 5, we provide numerical results on FRUS instances that
are constructed as described above, but when modifying the inter-activity time distribution and
assuming it is geometric with mean 7 days, i.e., g(τ) = 1
6
( 6
7
)τ . Figure 5 displays the ratio between
each policy and LPI across 25 simulations for such a setting. Since the platform does not observe
whether or not a volunteer is active, we compare our policies to other benchmarks suitable for
this setting. First, we consider a simplistic ‘notify-all’ heuristic that resembles a mass notification
system commonly used in nonprofit settings. Next, we consider a highly intelligent heuristic ‘notify-
upto-ρ,’ which notifies volunteers in descending order of pv,s until the probability of any volunteer
30 We remark that for ‘notify-random-n’ and ‘notify-best-n’, we have optimized over n, which turned out to be 1 in
all 3 regions and for both heuristics.
31 Our policies outperform their competitive ratio in part because using x∗ as an ex ante solution as defined in (5)
improves upon using x∗LP by an average of 12% across the largest FRUS locations, including Locations (a), (b), and
(c) presented above.
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Figure 5 The left plot shows the fraction of LP achieved in Location (a) by our policies and two heuristics
assuming a geometric inter-activity time. The plots in the middle and right, respectively, do the same for
Locations (b) and (c).
responding positively exceeds ρ. As an example, suppose a task of type s arrives at time t, with
p1,s ≥ p2,s ≥ . . .≥ pV,s; in addition, suppose the platform currently believes that volunteer v is active
with probability av, for all v ∈ [V ]. Under this heuristic, the platform notifies volunteers 1,2, . . . , u
where u marks the volunteer for which 1−∏uv=1(1− pv,sav)≥ ρ but 1−∏u−1v=1(1− pv,sav)< ρ. We
consider two values of ρ, 0.25 and 0.5. We also consider a more simplistic ‘notify-all’ heuristic that
resembles a mass notification system commonly used in nonprofit settings. Once again, the SN
policy vastly outperforms the simple heuristic (in this case, ‘notify-all’) in all three locations. In
addition, the SN policy exhibits significantly better performance than the stronger heuristics in at
least one location (e.g., Location (b)) and always performs comparably to the best heuristic.
Given that all of the model primitives except the inter-activity time distribution are the same for
the results presented in Figures 4 and 5, we can assess how the performance of our policies changes
when the inter-activity time changes from being deterministic to being random and geometrically
distributed (with the same mean). Averaging across the three locations, the total number of tasks
completed by the SDN (SN) policy is on average 7% (24%) more in the former, i.e., deterministic,
setting than in the latter, i.e., geometric. However, the benchmark is also larger when the inter-
activity time is deterministic by an average of 5%. As a consequence, in the former setting, the
SDN (SN) policy achieves ratios that are 2% (19%) better than in the latter setting. We highlight
that both policies perform better in the deterministic setting despite having a better worst-case
guarantee in the geometric setting (recall that the worst-case guarantee, given in Theorems 1 and
2 and shown in Figure 2, is increasing in the MDHR, q, which is 0 in the deterministic setting).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we take an algorithmic approach to a commonly faced challenge on volunteer-based
crowdsourcing platforms: how to utilize volunteers for time-sensitive tasks at the “right” pace
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while maximizing the number of completed tasks. We introduce the online volunteer notification
problem to model volunteer behavior as well as the trade-off that the platform faces in this online
decision making process. We develop two online policies that achieve constant-factor guarantees
parameterized by the MDHR of the volunteer inter-activity time distribution, which gives insight
into the impact of volunteers’ activity level. The guarantees provided by our policies are close to
the upper bound we establish for the performance of any online policy. Our general framework can
be applied to a wide range of settings and can be extended to encompass other practical consid-
erations. For one example, our model and policies can be adjusted to accommodate heterogeneous
inter-activity time distributions. In addition, if more than one task can arrive in a given period,
our framework could be adjusted to allow the platform to present volunteers with a subset of avail-
able tasks when sending a notification. Extending our policies to such a setting by incorporating
volunteers’ choice—when faced with a subset—through individualized discrete choice functions is
an interesting direction for future research. Further, in this work, we measure the performance of
an online policy by comparing it to an LP-based benchmark which upper-bounds a clairvoyant
solution. From a theoretical perspective, considering other benchmarks (perhaps less strong) is an
interesting future direction.
This work is motivated by our collaboration with FRUS, a leading volunteer-based food recovery
platform, analysis of whose data confirms that, by and large, volunteers have persistent preferences.
Leveraging on historical data, we estimate the match probability between volunteer-task pairs as
well as the arrival rate of tasks. This enables us to test our policies on FRUS data from different
locations and illustrate their effectiveness compared to common practice. From an applied perspec-
tive, developing decision tools that can be integrated with the FRUS app is an immediate next
step that we plan to pursue. Finding other platforms that can benefit from our work is another
direction for future work.
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Appendix A: Proofs for Section 3
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
To show that LP is an upper bound on the clairvoyant solution, we will construct a feasible solution x∈P
based on the clairvoyant solution. We will then prove that the value of this solution is an upper bound on
the value of the clairvoyant solution.
Let us define the random variables representing inter-activity times as ~Z ∈ ~Z = NV×T , where Zv,t is the
inter-activity time of volunteer v if notified at time t. In addition, we denote the random arrival sequence
as ~S ∈ ~S = [S]T , where St is the arrival at time t. Finally, suppose we have an indicator variable ωv,t(~s,~z),
which is equal to one if and only if the clairvoyant solution contacts volunteer v at time t when the arrival
order is given by ~s and the inter-activity times are given by ~z. Recall that we consider a clairvoyant solution
that knows the arrival order and the status of each volunteer, but it does not know Zv,t until after time t
(see Footnote 12). Consequently, ωv,t(~s,~z) cannot depend on zv,t′ for t
′ ≥ t.
For any volunteer v, task of type j, and time t, we define xˆ := {xˆv,j,t : v ∈ [V ], j ∈ [S], t∈ [T ]} such that
xˆv,j,t =
∑
~s∈~S
∑
~z∈ ~Z
P
(
~S = ~s|St = j
)
P
(
~Z = ~z
)
ωv,t(~s,~z).
To show that xˆ ∈ P (see Definition 2), we immediately note that xˆv,j,t ∈ [0,1], since we are summing
indicator variables over a probability distribution. We now need to show that constraint (2) is met, namely
that 1≥∑tt′=1∑Sj=1 λj,txˆv,j,t(1−G(t− t′)). Note that for a given sequence of arrivals ~s and inter-activity
times given by ~z, we must have
1≥
t∑
t′=1
ωv,t′(~s,~z)I
(
zv,t′ > t− t′
)
(26)
This is because both ωv,t′(~s,~z) and I
(
zv,t′ > t− t′
)
are indicator variables, and if both equal 1 at time t′,
then the volunteer v must be inactive until after time t. Since the clairvoyant solution only notifies active
volunteers, if volunteer v is inactive from t′ until after t, then ωv,t′′(~s,~z) = 0 for all t′′ ∈ [t′+ 1, t]. Thus, the
sum from t′ = 1 to t′ = t of the product of these indicator variables cannot exceed 1. We now take a weighted
sum over all possible arrival sequences and inter-activity times:
1≥
t∑
t′=1
∑
~s∈~S
P
(
~S = ~s
)∑
~z∈ ~Z
P
(
~Z = ~z
)
ωv,t′(~s,~z)I
(
zv,t′ > t− t′
)
=
t∑
t′=1
∑
~s∈~S
P
(
~S = ~s
)∑
~z∈ ~Z
P
(
~Z = ~z
)
ωv,t′(~s,~z)
∑
~z∈ ~Z
P
(
~Z = ~z
)
I
(
zv,t′ > t− t′
) (27)
=
t∑
t′=1
∑
~s∈~S
P
(
~S = ~s
)∑
~z∈ ~Z
P
(
~Z = ~z
)
ωv,t′(~s,~z)
 (1−G(t− t′)) (28)
=
t∑
t′=1
S∑
j=1
λj,t′
∑
~s∈~S
P
(
~S = ~s|St′ = j
)∑
~z∈ ~Z
P
(
~Z = ~z
)
ωv,t′(~s,~z)
 (1−G(t− t′)) (29)
=
t∑
t′=1
S∑
j=1
λj,t′ xˆv,j,t′(1−G(t− t′)) (30)
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In line (27), we use the independence of ωv,t′(~s,~z) and I
(
zv,t′ > t− t′
)
to rewrite the expected value of their
product as the product of their expectations. We substitute in the expected value of I
(
zv,t′ > t− t′
)
in line
(28). In line (29), we use the law of total probability to sum over all possible arriving task types in time t′.
We then substitute in the definition of xˆ in line (30). This proves that xˆ∈P.
It remains to be shown that
∑T
t=1
∑S
s=1 λs,tmin{
∑V
v=1 xˆv,s,tpv,s,1} is at least the value of the clairvoyant
solution. Let Cs,t be the event that a task of type s arrives at time t and is completed when following the
clairvoyant solution. We must have P (Cs,t) ≤ λs,t. In addition, since a volunteer must respond in order to
complete a task, we must have
P (Cs,t)≤ λs,t
∑
~s∈~S
∑
~z∈ ~Z
P
(
~S = ~s|St = j
)
P
(
~Z = ~z
) V∑
v=1
ωv,t(~s,~z)pv,s = λs,t
V∑
v=1
xˆv,s,tpv,s.
Combining these two bounds and summing over all task types and time periods, we see that the clairvoyant
solution must be at most
∑T
t=1
∑S
s=1 λs,tmin{
∑V
v=1 xˆv,s,tpv,s,1}. Since xˆ ∈ P and achieves a weakly larger
value than the clarivoyant solution, we have shown that LP is an upper bound on the clairvoyant solution.
Appendix B: Proofs for Section 4
B.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Let
fˆ(x) :=
V∑
v=1
fv(x) =
V∑
v=1
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(∏
u<v
(1− pu,sxu,s,t)
)
pv,sxv,s,t.
We prove by induction on V that f(x) = fˆ(x), where f(x) is defined in (3). As a base case, suppose V = 1.
In this case, f(x) =
∑T
t=1
∑S
s=1 λs,t
(
1−∏1
v=1(1− pv,sxv,s,t)
)
= f1(x) so f(x) and fˆ(x) are equivalent.
Now suppose this holds for V = k. We will show f(x) = fˆ(x) when V = k+ 1.
f(x) =
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(
1−
k+1∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s)
)
(31)
=
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(
1− (1−xk+1,s,tpk+1,s)
k∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s)
)
(32)
=
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,t
(
1−
k∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s)
)
+
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,txk+1,s,tpk+1,s
k∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s) (33)
=
k∑
v=1
fv(x) +
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
λs,txk+1,s,tpk+1,s
k∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s) (34)
=
k+1∑
v=1
fv(x) (35)
=fˆ(x) (36)
All steps are algebraic except for Line (34), which makes use of the inductive hypothesis. This completes the
proof by induction that the two formulas are algebraically equivalent.
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B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
To prove this proposition, we first focus on a particular task type s at a particular time t and prove that for
any x∈P,
1−
V∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s)≥ (1− 1
e
) min{
V∑
v=1
xv,s,tpv,s,1}.
To prove the above inequality, we find the minimum possible value of 1 −∏V
v=1(1 − xv,s,tpv,s) when
min{∑Vv=1 xv,s,tpv,s,1} is fixed and equal to c∈ [0,1]. This is equivalent to solving the program:
maximize{xv,s,t:v∈[V ]}
V∏
v=1
(1−xv,s,tpv,s) (37)
subject to c=
V∑
v=1
xv,s,tpv,s
Claim 1. For a fixed number of volunteers V = n, the value of (37) is less than or equal to (1− c
n
)n.
Proof: First, we make a change of variables yv,s,t = xv,s,tpv,s, where yv,s,t ∈ [0, pv,s]. Relaxing this con-
straint to yv,s,t ∈ [0,1] provides an upper bound on (37). We now prove by induction on n that the solution
to this relaxed problem is yv,s,t =
c
n
for all v. In the base case with one volunteer, the objective becomes
maximizing y1,s,t subject to y1,s,t = c, which has a trivial solution.
We now assume this holds for n= k. If there are k+ 1 volunteers, we consider the problem
maximize{yv,s,t:v∈[k+1]} (1− yk+1,s,t)
(∏
v≤k
(1− yv,s,t)
)
subject to c= yk+1,s,t +
k∑
v=1
yv,s,t
For any given yk+1,s,t ∈ [0,1], we can apply the inductive hypothesis to solve yv,s,t = c−yk+1,s,tk for v ∈ [k]. This
yields a single variable maximization problem with objective function (1− yk+1,s,t)(1− c−yk+1,s,tk )k. Taking
the derivative, this has first order condition of
(1− c− yk+1,s,t
k
)k−1(1− yk+1,s,t− 1 + c− yk+1,s,t
k
) = 0.
One can verify that the solution yk+1,s,t =
c
k+1
is the maximum. This implies that yv,s,t =
c−yk+1,s,t
k
= c
k+1
for all v ∈ [k+ 1], which completes the proof by induction. Plugging these values for yv,s,t into the objective
function, we get a value of (1− c
n
)n, which completes the proof of Claim 1. 
Based on this claim, 1−∏Vv=1(1− xv,s,tpv,s) must be at least 1− (1− cn )n when ∑Vv=1 xv,s,tpv,s = c. This
means that the ratio between the two must be at least
1−(1− c
n
)n
c
.
Claim 2. For any n∈N and c∈ [0,1], the function 1−(1− cn )n
c
is greater than 1− 1
e
.
Proof: We first show that n log(1− c
n
) is increasing in n, which implies that the numerator is decreasing
in n. The derivative of that expression with respect to n is given by log(1− c
n
) + c
n−c ≥ −cn−c + cn−c = 0, using
the inequality log(1−x)≥ −x
1−x . This means that the function is decreasing in n, regardless of c.
Taking the limit as n gets large, the ratio can be written as 1−e
−c
c
. The derivative of this expression with
respect to c is given by (1+c)e
−c−1
c2
= e
−c(1+c−ec)
c2
≤ 0. Thus, this expression is decreasing in c. It is minimized
at c= 1, where it attains a value of 1− 1
e
. 
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Proving this claim establishes that for any x∈P, any task of type s∈ [S], and any time t∈ [T ], 1−∏V
v=1(1−
xv,s,tpv,s)≥ (1− 1e ) min{
∑V
v=1 xv,s,tpv,s,1}. If we apply this inequality to x∗LP and take a weighted sum over
all task types and time periods, this completes the proof of the proposition, e.g. f(x∗LP)≥ (1− 1e )LP.
Appendix C: Proofs for Section 5
C.1. Proof of Lemma 6
In instance I1, a feasible solution to (LP) is xˆ1,2,2 = 1 and xˆ1,1,1 = 1−. Clearly, this solution meets constraint
(1) as well as constraint (2) at time 1. To verify that it meets constraint (2) at time 2, note that (1− )(1−
q) + 
1−q = 1− (1− (2−q)1−q )q, which is at most 1 as long as ≤ 1−q2−q . This solution achieves (1− )+ 1−q =
( 2−q−(1−q)
1−q ) completed tasks in expectation.
Since it is clearly optimal to notify v in period 2, an online policy only has one choice to make: whether
or not to notify v in period 1. If notified in period 1, v will complete + q 
1−q =

1−q tasks in expectation.
Otherwise, v will complete 
1−q tasks in expectation. Thus, no online policy can achieve a value greater than

1−q . This represents a competitive ratio of no more than
1
2−q−(1−q) , which approaches
1
2−q as  gets small.
C.2. Proof of Lemma 7
We prove Lemma 7 in three steps. First, we show LP≥ n. Then, we establish that always notifying every
volunteer is the best online policy. Finally, we assess the performance of this policy relative to LP. For ease
of reference, we repeat the definition of instance I2 below:
Instance I2: Suppose V = 1q = n, S = 1, T = n2 +1, and g(·) is the geometric distribution with parameter
q, e.g. g(τ) = q(1− q)τ−1. The arrival probabilities are given by λ1,1 = 1 and λ1,t = q for t ∈ [T ] \ [1]. The
volunteers are homogeneous with pv,1 = q for all v ∈ [V ].
Claim 3. In instance I2, LP≥ n
Proof: To prove this claim, we first show that solution xˆv,s,t = 1 for all v ∈ [n] and t ∈ [T ] is feasible.
Clearly, it satisfies constraint (1). Now consider constraint (2) for an arbitrary v ∈ [n] and t∈ [T ]:
t∑
τ=1
λ1,τ xˆv,s,t(1− q)t−τ = (1− q)t−1 +
t∑
τ=2
q(1− q)t−τ (38)
= (1− q)t−1 + q
t−2∑
τ ′=0
(1− q)τ ′
= (1− q)t−1 + q 1− (1− q)
t−1
q
= 1
Line (38) comes from plugging in λ1,1 = 1 and λ1,τ = q for τ ∈ [T ] \ [1]. Now that we have established the
feasibility of xˆ, we can calculate the value of (LP) at that solution, which is given by
T∑
t=1
λs,tmin{
V∑
v=1
xˆv,s,tq,1}=
T∑
t=1
λs,t = 1 +n≥ n.

Manshadi and Rodilitz: Efficient Volunteer Crowdsourcing 43
Now that we have a lower bound on LP, we turn our attention to placing an upper bound on any online
policy. We do so with the following claim.
Claim 4. Notifying every active volunteer whenever a task of type 1 arrives completes at least as many
tasks in expectation as any other online policy.
Proof: We first note that the best online policy cannot do better in expectation than the best online
policy that also knows the status of each volunteer v ∈ [V ] at each time t ∈ [T ] because designing a policy
without using that additional information is always an option. Thus, it is sufficient to show that notifying
every active volunteer whenever a task of type 1 arrives achieves a weakly greater expected value than any
online policy that knows each volunteer’s status.
We proceed via total backward induction, with a base case at time T . Suppose an arrival occurs at time
T . If there are α1 active volunteers, notifying α2 of them achieves a value-to-go of 1− (1− q)α2 . This is
increasing in α2, which means that the optimal online policy is to contact all active volunteers.
Let J˜τ+1 represent the value-to-go when an arrival occurred in period τ given an online policy that notifies
all active volunteers at τ and all future arrivals. Note that we can only make this representation because the
inter-activity times are geometrically distributed, which implies that volunteers’ transitions from inactive to
active are memoryless. Thus the expected payoff is the same regardless of the choices made before period τ .
By convention, we set J˜T+1 = 0.
Now we make the inductive hypothesis that contacting all active volunteers whenever a task of type 1
arrives is the best online policy for t∈ [T ] \ [k]. We will show that if an arrival occurs at time k, an optimal
online policy is to contact all active volunteers. The expected payoff of contacting α2 volunteers when α1 are
active is given by
hk,α1(α2) =P (task completed at time k) +E (tasks completed from k+ 1 to T ) (39)
=P (task completed at time k) +
T∑
τ=k+1
P (next arrival at τ)E (tasks completed from k+ 1 to T |next arrival at τ) (40)
=1− (1− q)α2+ (41)
T∑
τ=k+1
q(1− q)τ−k−1 (1− (1− q)α1−α2(1− q(1− (1− q)τ−k))n−α1+α2)+ (42)
T∑
τ=k+1
q(1− q)τ−k−1J˜τ+1 (43)
In line (40), we use the law of total probability. Line (41) represents the probability of completing the task
at time k. Each term in the summation in line (42) represents the probability that the next task arrives at
τ and that task gets completed. To compute this probability, first note that we know that at time τ there
will be α1−α2 volunteers who are definitely active. The remaining volunteers will be independently active
with probability 1− (1− q)τ−k. Thus, each of these remaining volunteers will respond to a notification with
probability q(1− (1−q)τ−k). Since the inductive hypothesis assumes that the online policy will contact every
active volunteer at τ > k, the probability of any volunteer completing the next task (conditional on an arrival
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at τ) is given by 1− (1− q)α1−α2(1− q(1− (1− q)τ−k))n−α1+α2 . In line (43), we add the remaining expected
number of completed tasks from τ + 1 to T after an arrival in period τ , which does not depend on the choice
of α2 due to the memorylessness of the transitions from inactive to active.
We now define ∆k,α1(α2) = hk,α1(α2 + 1)− hk,α1(α2) for 0≤ α2 ≤ α1 − 1. This is the incremental benefit
of notifying one additional active volunteer. We have
∆k,α1(α2) =(1− q)α2 − (1− q)α2+1 +
T∑
τ=k+1
q(1− q)τ−k−1×
[(1− q)α1−α2(1− q(1− (1− q)τ−k))n−α1+α2
− (1− q)α1−α2−1(1− q(1− (1− q)τ−k))n−α1+α2+1]
=q(1− q)α2 +
T∑
τ=k+1
q(1− q)τ−k−1(1− 1− q(1− (1− q)
τ−k)
1− q )×
[(1− q)α1−α2(1− q(1− (1− q)τ−k))n−α1+α2 ] (44)
=q(1− q)α2 −
T∑
τ=k+1
q(1− q)τ−k−1(q(1− q)τ−k−1)×
[(1− q)α1−α2(1− q(1− (1− q)τ−k))n−α1+α2 ] (45)
≥q(1− q)α1−1−
T∑
τ=k+1
q2(1− q)2(τ−k−1)[(1− q)(1− q(1− (1− q)τ−k))n−1] (46)
≥q(1− q)n−1−
∞∑
τ ′=1
q2(1− q)2τ ′−1(1− q(1− (1− q)τ ′)n−1 (47)
=q(1− q)n−1
(
1−
∞∑
τ ′=1
q(1− q)2τ ′−1(1 + q(1− q)τ ′−1)n−1
)
(48)
≥0
In line (44) we factor like terms. In line (45) we simplify the fraction. In line (46) we lower bound the
expression by replacing α2 with α1 − 1, its maximum value. To see that this is a valid lower bound, note
that this decreases the first term and increases each term in the summation, which decreases the overall
expression. In line (47), we simplify the bounds of the summation and provide a lower bound (an upper
bound on a negative term) by summing all the way to infinity and by setting α1 = n, which decreases the
first term and otherwise has no impact. We then factor out terms and simplify to get (48). Numerically, we
can verify that this term is weakly positive.
Since ∆k,α1(α2)≥ 0 for all α2 ≤ α1− 1≤ n− 1, we have proved the inductive hypothesis that notifying all
active volunteers in period k is optimal. This completes the proof of the claim. 
We now provide an upper bound on the value of this optimal online policy.
Claim 5. The value of notifying every active volunteer whenever a task of type s arrives is at most
q+
(
1− q(1−q)
log( 1
1−q )(1+q)
(1− e−1)
)
.
Proof: If we notify every volunteer at every arrival, then in the first period, we achieve a payoff of
1 − (1 − q)n ≤ 1. Now suppose every volunteer was most recently notified at time τ − 1. Recall that the
expected reward for the remainder of the time horizon is given by J˜τ . By definition, the value of this policy
is given by 1− (1− q)n + J˜2 ≤ 1 + J˜2.
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Starting with J˜T+1 = 0, we can recursively compute J˜τ with the following update equation:
J˜τ =
T∑
t=τ
q(1− q)t−τ (1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−τ+1))n)+ T∑
t=τ
q(1− q)t−τ J˜t+1 (49)
In equation (49), q(1−q)t−τ represents the probability that the next arrival of a task of type 1 occurs at time
t. The probability that such a task gets completed is given by 1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−τ+1))n. Thus, the first
sum is the probability that the next arriving task gets completed. The second sum represents the expected
number of tasks completed after that arrival.
We will prove via total backward induction that J˜τ ≤ q(T + 1 − τ)ζ, where ζ represents the expected
probability of completing the next task unconditional on when it arrives, i.e.
ζ :=
∞∑
t=1
q(1− q)t−1(1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t))n).
In words, we are upper-bounding the value-to-go after an arrival with the expected number of remaining
arrivals q(T + 1− τ) times the (unconditional) expected probability of completing the next task.
Clearly, this holds with equality for τ = T + 1. We now assume this is true for τ ≥ k+ 1, and we will try
to show that J˜k ≤ q(T + 1− k)ζ. First, in step (i), we will be place a bound on the first summation in Line
(49). Then, in step (ii), we will place a bound on the second summation.
Step (i): We begin by noting that the probability of completing a task is increasing in the amount of time
since the previous arrival. Mathematically, the function ρ(t) := 1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−k+1))n is increasing
in t. Therefore maxt∈[T ]\[k−1]{ρ(t)}<mint∈N\[T ]{ρ(t)}, i.e., every member of the former set is smaller than
every member of the latter. Consequently, any convex combination of the former set is smaller than any
convex combination of the latter. Thus we have:∑T
t=k q(1− q)t−k (1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−k+1))n)∑T
t=k q(1− q)t−k
≤
∑∞
t=T+1 q(1− q)t−k (1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−k+1))n)∑∞
t=T+1 q(1− q)t−k
Now we use the above inequality in combination with the algebraic fact that if a
c
≤ b
d
, then a
c
≤ a+b
c+d
to yield∑T
t=k q(1− q)t−k (1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−k+1))n)∑T
t=k q(1− q)t−k
≤
∑∞
t=k q(1− q)t−k (1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−k+1))n)∑∞
t=k q(1− q)t−k
=
ζ∑∞
t=k q(1− q)t−k
= ζ
Consequently,
T∑
t=k
q(1− q)t−k (1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t−k+1))n)≤ ζ T∑
t=k
q(1− q)t−k
= ζ(1− (1− q)T−k+1) (50)
By putting a bound on the first summation in line (49), we have completed step (i).
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Step (ii): Having upper-bounded the first summation, we now bound the second summation in line (49),
i.e.,
∑T
t=k q(1− q)t−kJ˜t+1. Using the inductive hypothesis, we have
T∑
t=k
q(1− q)t−kJ˜t+1 ≤ q
T∑
t=k
q(1− q)t−k(T − t)ζ
= q
T−k∑
t′=0
q(1− q)t′(T − k− t′)ζ
= q
(
T−k∑
t′=0
q(1− q)t′(T − k)ζ −
T−k∑
t′=0
q(1− q)t′t′ζ
)
= q(T − k)(1− (1− q)T−k+1)ζ − (1− q)(1− (1− q)T−k− (T − k)q(1− q)T−k)ζ (51)
= q(T − k+ 1)ζ − (1− (1− q)T−k+1)ζ (52)
The equality in line (51) follows from well-known results in computing the summation of power series.
Combining (50) and (52) gives us, as desired, J˜k ≤ q(T − k+ 1)ζ, which completes the proof by induction.
All that remains is to bound ζ, which we do below, starting from its definition:
ζ =
∞∑
t=1
q(1− q)t−1(1− (1− q(1− (1− q)t))n)
=
∞∑
t=1
q(1− q)t−1−
∞∑
t=1
q(1− q)t−1(1− q(1− (1− q)t))n (53)
≤ 1−
∫ ∞
t=1
q(1− q)t−1(1− q(1− (1− q)t))ndt (54)
= 1 +
q
log(1− q)(1− q)
∫ 1
u=q
(1− qu)ndu (55)
= 1 +
q
log(1− q)(1− q)
(
(1− q2)n+1− (1− q)n+1
nq+ q
)
(56)
= 1 +
q(1− q)n
log(1− q)(nq+ q)
(
(1 + q)n+1− 1) (57)
= 1− q(1− q)
log( 1
1−q )(1 + q)
(1− q)1/q−1 ((1 + q)1/q+1− 1) (58)
≤ 1− q(1− q)
log( 1
1−q )(1 + q)
(1− e−1) (59)
In line (53), we split the summation into two parts. In line (54), we evaluate the first summation and
lower-bound the second sum with an integral. Line (55) comes from a substitution of u= 1− (1− q)t and in
line (56) we evaluate the integral. In line (57), we factor out (1−q)
n+1
nq+q
. Subsequently, in line (58), we make
minor algebraic adjustments and make use of the definition q = 1/n. The final inequality in line (59) comes
from bounding two auxiliary functions, as described below.
First, we define φ1(q) := (1− q)1/q−1. This function is increasing for q ∈ (0,1), and limq→0 φ1(q) = e−1,
which means (1− q)1/q−1 ≥ 1
e
. This enables us to lower bound φ1(q) with e
−1.
Next, we define φ2(q) := (1 + q)
1/q+1− 1. This function is also increasing for q ∈ (0,1), and limq→0 φ2(q) =
e− 1. This enables us to lower bound φ2(q) with e− 1. The inequality in line (59) results from multiplying
the two bounds provided by φ1(q) and φ2(q).
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Figure 6 Left: Visualization of instance I4. Right: Visualization of instance I5.
This implies that J˜2 ≤ q(T − 1)(1− q(1−q)log( 1
1−q )(1+q)
(1− e−1)). Since q(T − 1) = n by definition, and since the
total expected number of successful tasks is bounded by 1+ J˜(2), we have proven the claim that the value of
notifying every active volunteer whenever a task of type 1 arrives is at most 1+n
(
1− q(1−q)
log( 1
1−q )(1+q)
(1− e−1)
)
.

Putting all three claims together (e.g. taking the upper bound on the expected number of completed
tasks by the best online policy and dividing by a lower bound on LP), we have shown that in I2, no online
algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of more than 1 + q− q(1−q)
log( 1
1−q )(1+q)
(1− e−1).
Appendix D: Examples Comparing Ex Ante Candidate Solutions
In the following instances, we first present evidence that f(x∗LP) can be significantly less than f(x
∗), where
f(·) is defined in (3), x∗LP is the solution to (LP), and x∗ is defined in (5). We then present evidence that
f(x∗LP) can be strictly greater than f(x
∗
AA) and f(x
∗
SQ), thus necessitating its inclusion as a candidate.
Instance I4: Suppose V = 2, S = 2, T = 2, and g(1) = 0. The arrival probabilities are given by λ1,1 = 1
and λ2,2 = 1. The volunteer match probabilities are given by p1,1 = p2,1 = 0.5 and p2,2 = 0.5−, where  << 1.
The left panel of Figure 6 visualizes instance I4.
In instance I4, f(x∗LP) can be significantly less than f(x∗AA) and f(x∗SQ) To see why, note that:
• The solution x∗LP is x1,1,1 = x2,1,1 = 1 and x2,2,2 = 0. Consequently, f(x∗LP) = 0.75.
• Suppose the number of steps used when computing x∗AA is n = 2. Then, the solution is x1,1,1 = 1,
x2,1,1 = 0.5, and x2,2,2 = 0.5, which yields f(x
∗
AA) = 0.875− 0.5.
• The solution x∗SQ is x1,1,1 = 1, x2,1,1 = 0, and x2,2,2 = 1 which attains a value f(x∗SQ) = 1− .
With the above solutions, if 1>> , f(x∗SQ)≈ 1 and f(x∗AA)≈ 0.875, both of which represent a significant
improvement over f(x∗LP) = 0.75.
32
32 We remark that if the volunteers’ indices were switched, then we would have f(x∗AA)> f(x
∗
SQ), which justifies the
inclusion of both of these solutions as ex ante candidates.
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Table 2 Mean percent change in the number of completed tasks in the presence of estimation errors.
SDN Policy SN Policy
Loc. (a) Loc. (b) Loc. (c) Loc. (a) Loc. (b) Loc. (c)
pˆv,s ∈ [0.9pv,s,1.1pv,s] −0.13% 0.59% 0.84% 0.33% 0.30% −0.48%
λˆs,t ∈ [0.9λs,t,1.1λs,t] 0.05% 0.27% −0.45% 0.01% −0.71% −1.14%
Instance I5: Suppose V = 4, S = 2, T = 2, and g(1) = 0. The arrival probabilities are given by λ1,1 = 1
and λ2,2 = 1. The volunteer match probabilities are given by p1,1 = p2,1 =
1
3
, p4,2 =
11
18
, p3,1 =
1
3
, and p3,2 =
1
3
− 1
1000
. The right panel of Figure 6 visualizes instance I5.
In instance I5, f(x∗LP) is strictly greater than f(x∗AA) and f(x∗SQ). To see this, note that:
• The solution x∗LP is x1,1,1 = 1, x2,1,1 = 1, x3,1,1 = 1, and x4,2,2 = 1, which attains a value f(x∗LP) = 1.315.
• Suppose the number of steps used when computing x∗AA is n= 5. Then, the solution is x1,1,1 = 1, x2,1,1 =
1, x3,1,1 = 0.6, x3,2,2 = 0.4, and x4,2,2 = 1, which yields f(x
∗
AA) = 1.307.
33
• The solution x∗SQ is x1,1,1 = 1, x2,1,1 = 1, x3,2,2 = 1, and x4,2,2 = 1 which attains a value f(x∗SQ) = 1.296.
Thus, in instance I5, x∗LP = argmaxx∈{x∗
LP
,x∗
AA
,x∗
SQ
}f(x).
Appendix E: Additional Numerical Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate that our two policies are robust in the presence of estimation error. In Table
2, we report the average percent change in the number of tasks completed in settings where we misestimate
the actual arrival rates or match probabilities. Specifically, in the first row, we consider cases when pˆv,s
is uniformly distributed in the interval [0.9pv,s,1.1pv,s]. In the second row, we consider cases when λˆs,t is
uniformly distributed in the interval [0.9λs,t,1.1λs,t]. We generate 10 different perturbations of each of the
two model primitives, and for each perturbation, we simulate our policies 500 times. In all cases, we follow
the current practice at most FRUS locations and assume the inter-activity time is deterministically equal to
seven days (as discussed further in Section 6).
As we observe in Table 2, the decrease in the number of completed tasks is never more than 1.14% for
either policy. In fact, in some settings (e.g. in Location (b) for the SDN policy), the expected number of tasks
completed actually increases. These results suggest that even if the ex ante solution is computed based on
misestimated model primitives, notifying volunteers based on such a solution (after modifications according
to our two polices) results in good performance.
33 We remark that for any n> 2, f(x∗AA)< f(x
∗
LP).
